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ABSTRACT
With the increasing user demand for low latency, elastic provisioning of computing
resources coupled with ubiquitous and on-demand access to real-time data, cloud com-
puting has emerged as a popular computing paradigm to meet growing user demands
(Daly (2013)). However, with the introduction and rising use of wearable technol-
ogy and evolving uses of smart-phones, the concept of Internet of Things (IoT) has
become a prevailing notion in the currently growing technology industry. Cisco Inc.
has projected a data creation of approximately 403 Zetabytes (ZB) by 2018 (Bradley
(2013)). The combination of bringing benign devices and connecting them to the web
has resulted in exploding service and data aggregation requirements, thus requiring
a new and innovative computing platform. This platform should have the capability
to provide robust real-time data analytics and resource provisioning to clients, such
as IoT users, on-demand. Such a computation model would need to function at the
edge-of-the-network, forming a bridge between the large cloud data centers and the
distributed connected devices.
This research expands on the notion of bringing computational power to the edge-
of-the-network, and then integrating it with the cloud computing paradigm whilst
providing services to diverse IoT-based applications. This expansion is achieved
through the establishment of a new computing model that serves as a platform for
IoT-based devices to communicate with services in real-time. We name this paradigm
as Gateway-Oriented Reconfigurable Ecosystem (GORE) computing. Finally, this
thesis proposes and discusses the development of a policy management framework
for accommodating our proposed computational paradigm. The policy framework is
designed to serve both the hosted applications and the GORE paradigm by enabling
them to function more efficiently. The goal of the framework is to ensure uninter-
rupted communication and service delivery between users and their applications.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Recent technology developments and device releases, most notably those utilizing the
concept of Internet of Things (IoT) have gained considerable popularity from both
academia and industry professionals. The demand for these devices is attributed
to the fact that they can connect to the Internet and among themselves, and they
can share data in real-time. Although data can be shared in real-time or near real-
time among devices, it is challenging to achieve the same when devices are required to
connect to remote servers and relate information between services hosted in computing
paradigms such as cloud computing. Additionally, when a large number of these
devices attempt to request information and services (such as data services, traffic
services, or health-care services) from a single component, latency becomes a pressing
and critical issue that must be addressed.
1.1 Internet of Things and Related Concepts
The term Internet of Thing was first introduced by Kevin Ashton in 1997 when
he became interested in using RFID to help manage P&G’s supply chain (McHugh
(2004)). However the concept of IoT was being put into practice long before the
term was coined. Traces of making devices smarter and giving them the capability to
connect to the Internet date back to 1993 when the computer laboratory at the Uni-
versity of Cambridge created the Trojan Room Coffee Pot (Stafford-Fraser (1993)).
Fraser and his team converted (“hacked”) their coffee pot to send images of the coffee
level in their pot to the web.
Based on device functionality and utilization the Internet of Things (IoT) can be
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defined as a network of physical objects with the capability of communicating with
associated smart devices either directly or via the Internet thus enabling the sharing
and migration of data when required (Evans (2012)). This definition of IoT takes into
account devices with the capability of connecting to the web, however the definition
fails to take into account the inclusion of a human variable.
The data shared by IoT enabled devices is not just simple pieces of information,
but, due to people owning these devices, the information is more personal such as
user credentials, location information, biometric data, health-care related statistics,
and more, which further requires caution in securing and maintaining the integrity
of data. This inclusion of a human variable has given rise to a global concept termed
as the Internet of Everything (IoE). Cisco defines IoE as “bringing together people,
process, data and things to make networked connection more relevant and valuable”.
The concept of IoE encompasses every smart connected device, including personal
devices such as smart-phones and tablets, thus making IoT a significant component
of the larger IoE market (Evans (2012)).
Such connectivity and share-ability of device and information enables the prolif-
eration of connected objects, and in turn these objects create a data explosion which
comes from billions of devices located around the world. However, unless these dis-
tributed devices can communicate with each other, all the data is meaningless and
may eventually result in wastage of resources and higher storage costs (Mora (2014)).
1.2 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing has been developed along a number of lines. Increase in band-
width over the years has allowed for larger provisioning of resources including com-
puting, networking, and storage in distributive environments. One of the first major
milestones in the area of cloud is the establishment of salesforce.com in 1999. Sales-
2
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Figure 1.1: Cloud Infrastructure.
force opened a new era of cloud computing, which evolved to an enterprise model and
paved the way for companies like Amazon EC2 and Windows Azure cloud services to
provide enterprise-level service to clients on demand.
Current cloud computing infrastructure consists of three concrete layers as shown
in Fig 1.1:
• Software as a Service (SaaS): The application layer of the cloud computing
paradigm designed to host client-centric applications that can be accessed by
users worldwide at anytime.
• Platform as a Service (PaaS): The delivery layer designed to include platform
tools such as application execution environments, operating systems, databases,
and web-servers.
• Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): The physical entity of the cloud paradigm,
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which often involves a virtual component such as virtual machines running on
hypervisors. The IaaS is designed to provide the physical components required
to support the PaaS and SaaS layers. This includes server data centers, data
storages, hypervisors, networking routers, switches and so-on.
The maturity of the cloud computing model has reduced the overall cost of users
owning and managing private data centers. The cloud model is designed to deliver
computing as a service rather than a product. This business model has given rise
to increasing user demand for the resource utilization including computing, network-
ing, and storage. The cloud infrastructure itself supports a wide array of use-cases.
These use-cases could range from simple data storage to large scale enterprise appli-
cation support. Given the elasticity and flexibility of the cloud model as evident from
providers such as Amazon and Microsoft, developers believe that cloud computing
could support the large quantity of data generated from the smart connected devices
also referred to as IoT.
With the current cloud infrastructure set-up and usage model, IoTs communicate
directly with the virtualized instance through a Software-as-a-Service API which is
configured by an individual tenant renting resources from a vendor. Fig 1.2 illustrates
an overview of the current cloud usage model and its interaction with IoT based
devices. In addition to its usage model, the cloud infrastructure is designed to provide
centralized intelligence services to clients on demand. However, with the growing data
storage demand, retrieval of data becomes a challenge, due to resource centralization.
1.3 IoT and the Big Data Crisis
The earliest records of large data collection date back to the 1880’s when the first
United States census was recorded (Bureau (1990)). The census took eight years to
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Figure 1.2: Interaction Between Cloud and IoT.
tabulate and estimations made stated that the 1890 census would take more than 10
years using the then-available methods. The 1930’s ushered in a population boom in
the US bringing along with it a large quantity of data. This data included personal
identifiers such as social security numbers, user information and statistics, household
information, and more. The data recorded was for general research and demanded
more organized and thorough record keeping (Winshuttle (2014)). The arrival of the
1940’s brought with it the first warning of the data storage and retrieval problem.
Rider estimates “the Yale Library in 2040 would have approximate 200,000,000 vol-
umes which will occupy 6,000 miles of shelves requiring a cataloging staff of over six
5
thousand persons” (Press (2013) and Bell (2008)).
KPMG, one of the largest professional services company in the world and one of
the big four auditors of financial service in the United States, estimated a 30 percent
digital data explosion from 2011 to 2012 with approximately 1.8 ZB in store for 2011
(International (2012)). This data storage is further estimated to increase to 35 ZB
by 2020. This growing data statistics take into account all the data generated from
various industries such as transportation, health, investment banking, and others.
How this data is generated is an interesting question to delve into. While portions of
the data will be generated through direct user input and interaction with systems, it
is believed that automated data generation will play large role in contributing to the
data growth. This automated data generation could partially be a result of systems
monitoring user interaction or even systems analyzing and generating analytics based
on user behavior patterns. A simple example would be the health care industry: a
hospital room has numerous sensors and data collecting equipments that monitor a
patients’ vital stats. If this information is uploaded to servers, they are considered to
be collecting and storing data. Given the widespread use of smart connected devices,
and the sensors that could potentially be embedded into them, these smart devices
also known as IoT will play a big role in the expected data explosion by 2020.
In 2013, the United Nation Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) created a
temporary task team to evaluate the usage of Big Data for official statistics, identify
priority actions, and formulate project proposals (UNECE (2013)). Fig 1.3 illustrates
the obtained data growth projected by this team from various European countries.
The graph itself projects the explosive data growth expected by 2020 and shows the
Big Data problem we face.
As we discussed earlier the growing usage of the term IoT and the addition of a
human variable have given rise to the term IoE. It has estimated to capture a $14.4
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Figure 1.3: Big Data Growth (UNECE (2013)).
trillion market value with its usage (Cisco (2013)). Given the large cost and the even
bigger data storage requirement raises concerns of connecting this data to the user
and making sense of the large collection of data associated with a single user.
The solution to the Big Data problem is not simple, however successful industrial
solutions involve cloud archival systems, such as QlikView and RainStor ((Qlik.com
(2014) and RainStor (2013)), that enable storage of large quantities of data for his-
torical analysis and usage. However, when it comes to querying, analyzing, and
implementing functionalities to efficiently utilize this data, these tools do not pro-
vide a comprehensive solution as they still depend heavily on the cloud model for
computation. As discussed in Chapter 1.2, the cloud computing model serves as a
centralized resource center for application and data storage, however given the quan-
tity of data being stored, we believe a more distributed model is required for efficient
data aggregation.
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1.4 Support for Cloud Computing
Current computational models such as cloud computing and service oriented com-
puting cannot account for and handle the huge data load that will be generated by
the boom of IoT-based devices, and thus require an evolved computing paradigm with
the capability of communicating more closely with physical smart devices, a paradigm
that will behave as a gateway supporting interoperability among heterogeneous sys-
tems and networks. Such a paradigm would extend the cloud services to the edge of
the network. For purposes of this work, edge-network refers to a layer or interface
that sits between the physical world and the virtual components (SaaS or PaaS layers
in cloud).
With the capability to sit at the edge of the network and provision resources
on-demand, this envisioned computing paradigm has the capability to provide real-
time data services to customers as well as perform dynamic data aggregation based
on customer provided data. One such computational model has been recently pro-
posed and formulated as a basis of this research, called the Fog Computing paradigm
(Bonomi et al. (2012)). This thesis strives to achieve a computing model similar to
the Fog model, yet more innovative, unique, and robust. Therefore, this research will
describe the architecture for a Gateway-Based Computational paradigm highlighting
prominent concepts which are believed to provide the robustness and interoperability
desired for the successful interaction of IoTs.
To enable efficient, on-demand and real time support between smart devices and
their connecting services, we believe a new computing paradigm would assist in sup-
porting mobility and geo-distribution in combining with location awareness and low-
latency communication. Such a paradigm would function as a gateway to a larger
cloud computation model and would need to provision resources at the edge of the
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network wherein the virtual and physical components of technology interact to re-
quest services. We refer to such a computational paradigm as a gateway-based cyber-
physical paradigm wherein access to resources and services are dynamically provi-
sioned by a platform that intelligently detects, senses, and aggregates data from ser-
vices based on client demand. The model thus envisioned from this paradigm is called
GORE: Gateway-Oriented Reconfigurable Ecosystems. Additionally, provisioning of
services is not performed entirely by a virtual instance as in the Cloud Computing
model, but can be performed by physical components with access to a virtual instance
or a component that is virtualized to contain multiple virtual instances.
With the high density of IoTs being introduced into enterprises, including manu-
facturing floors, health-care devices, smart transportation systems, and smart grids,
the realization of middle-ware layer computing or edge computing represents a futur-
istic and novel computational model which provides consumers with the capability to
request and utilize data both in real-time as well as over a distributive and hetero-
geneous network whilst still having the capability to store large data into cloud data
centers. However, with any new technology or computational paradigm, security is of
importance and high concern, thus raising questions about data and communication
security as well as data migration and access.
The term security covers a wide array of topics covering user identification and
authentication up to data validation, analysis, and encryption. While security is
a broadly used terminology, for purposes of this work security is focused around
authentication, authorization, and validation of components in a system. This work
further delves into these three entities of security and focuses on a single security entity
that is considered vital to any core functionality of a system: Policy Management.
This work is thus constrained to analyzing and researching the need for a policy
management module in a distributed paradigm such as edge computing so as to enable
9
secure collaboration among cyber-physical systems and their interacting users.
Given the density of devices in a distributed environment, managing secure com-
munication between disparate systems and users becomes a challenge, especially with
the need for real-time communication. Supporting collaboration among IoTs is a
gateway-based computational paradigm which in itself is a complex architecture due
to its location at the edge of the network. The complexity of the GORE model in-
volves multiple layered infrastructure including an orchestration layer wherein all the
intelligent data aggregation occurs. Due to the high volume of moving variables in
such a paradigm there is a need for a fine grained policy management framework mod-
ule to ensure secure collaboration and secure provisioning of services and resources
to clients in real-time.
This work will focus on the GORE architecture and will further explore and
research the security infrastructure of such a framework from a policy management
perspective. The end goal of this work is to ensure seamless communication and secure
collaboration of not only computing systems but also user devices (IoTs) and cyber-
physical systems located at the edge of the network. Furthermore, we will discuss the
probable conflicts and anomalies that arise when heterogeneous systems attempt to
communicate and collaborate in a distributed environment and the possible detection
and resolution techniques employed by our policy management framework to resolve
such conflicts.
10
Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
Understanding the related work in the area of Big Data, Cloud Computing and Edge
Computing and their motivation for the introduction of a new computing paradigm
is vital towards conveying the ultimate goal of this research, which is the proposal of
a robust policy management framework in a GORE computing environment.
2.1 Related Work on Edge-Computing
Chapter 1 discussed the overall concept of IoT, cloud computing, and the realiza-
tion of a Big Data problem along with reasons as to why cloud computing will not
suffice as an efficient model for real-time communication. This chapter will discuss
the related work by leading research organizations so as to establish a platform in
understanding our proposed architecture and how it differs from current proposed
and implemented systems.
Efforts to realize real-time communication for IoTs have led to leading research
groups at IBM and Cisco to introduce two preliminary concepts: Edge Computing
and Fog Computing, respectively. Each computing paradigm is oriented to provide
IoTs with a platform to leverage resources in real time and obtain services on-demand.
However due to their infancy there are a number of components which require further
analysis and research.
2.1.1 Cisco — Fog Computing
Cisco research team introduced the concept of Fog Computing and its underlying
architecture with concise definitions and use-cases to promote the efficiency and neces-
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sity of such a dynamic platform (Bonomi et al. (2012)). They focused on two primary
use-case scenarios: Smart Transportation Systems and Wind Farm Systems. The Fog
architecture consists of three unique layers: (i) IoT verticals: which consists of muti-
tenant hosted applications utilizing a Fog architecture, (ii) Orchestration Layer API:
considered the brains of the architecture, where the analysis, planning, and execu-
tion of applications and related data occurs, (iii) Abstraction Layer API: which is
designed to hide the heterogeneity of the Fog architecture and provide a uniform pro-
grammable interface. Having recently proposed this architecture, the Fog paradigm
is still relatively new and fails to take into consideration a number of security criteria
which are needed in a heterogeneous system.
Further work on the Fog Computing architecture was pursued by Madsen et al.
(Madsen et al. (2013)) who evaluated the fog computing platform from a very ab-
stract perspective and have provided certain interesting evaluation criteria that a fog
platform should meet. Such criterion was a Machine-to-Machine (M2M) interaction
between two connected devices. The fog architecture only takes into account the
communication and collaboration between a smart device and its corresponding ap-
plication, however, by design, an IoT-oriented smart device will have the capability
to communicate with its adjacent smart device and share information between them.
However, the fog architecture does not provision such capabilities nor does it accom-
modate for M2M collaboration. A second evaluation conducted by Madsen et al. was
the reliability protocols that a fog system should utilize (Madsen et al. (2013)). These
protocols involve a network-based communication facilitation. However, they did not
present any conclusive implementation nor evaluation results of any reliability tests.
Cisco has however proposed three different networking protocols to support IoT com-
munication. These protocols include: 6LoWPAN, RPL, and CoAP, all of which focus
on a more real-time interaction between IoT based devices.
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Although preliminary, the fog framework attempts to realize the need for robust-
ness and real-time communication which previously was not a priority. However, the
framework was designed requires more maturity. A more dynamic and fine-grained
security model is required for the data that is expected to flow through the fog infras-
tructure. A key component in such a security model for a fog architecture is a policy
management model. The distributive nature of a fog computing environment re-
quires a secure policy management framework to support secure collaboration among
smart devices and their corresponding applications. However, the policy manage-
ment framework described in the current fog computing framework in (Bonomi et al.
(2014)) is primitive, as the policies described are abstract and specified from a busi-
ness perspective.
2.1.2 IBM — Edge Computing
In 2003, the IBM research group partnered with Akmai to push Java computing
to the edge of the Internet. This new service was called edge computing. Akmai
unveiled a new service that would enable users to run IBM’s customized WebSphere
applications on its network of edge servers. The edge computing architecture con-
sisted of two platforms: The WebSphere software platform and the edge computing
platform. The edge computing platform, designed by IBM, consisted of embedded
WebSphere application servers which could be accessed via a portal at runtime.
The platform was designed with a data-oriented approach in mind, but did not
take into account any distributed system requirements. The focus of the platform
revolved around the interaction of applications with the systems and end-users, along
with the access to data at the edge of the network. However, there were no clear
access control requirements nor provisioning set in place. Davis et al. (Andy Davis
(2004)), focused on the deployment of edge computing and the implementation of
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distributed applications to be hosted on such an architecture but did not focus on
the security criteria that needs to be taken into consideration when a geographically
distributed infrastructure with smart communicating devices is created.
Lewis et al. (Lewis et al. (2014)), proposed moving cloud computing functional-
ities to the edge of the network to leverage hosting of data on moving vehicles so
as to enable data offloading and dependency on cloud infrastructures. The research
conducted was part of the United States Department of Defense funding and focused
on the usage of edge-networking for military purposes. However, similar to IBM’s ap-
proach, the focus of their research was on the provisioning of distributed applications
to communicate with their cloudlet services and enabling communication between
devices and the edge devices. They failed to consider the access control mechanisms
or policy management frameworks that would need to be in place to realize a uniform
communication platform over a diverse and mobile distributed infrastructure.
Both research approaches fail to account for two critical functionalities in an edge
network: (i) Data distribution and (ii) user access provisioning and management.
Without the implementation of these two critical functionalities, an edge network
functions the same way as a cloud infrastructure: a centralized intelligence and storage
data center.
From the discussions in this chapter, it is clear that there are a number of moving
components involved in the collaboration and communication between smart devices
and their associated application services. The GORE paradigm, which will further
be discussed in Chapter 3 will embody all the previously mentioned requirements.
The GORE architecture will focus on a Machine-to-Infrastructure (M2I) model of
communication, of which further details will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
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2.2 Policy Management and Related Work
Policy analysis and management takes a higher precedence in diverse systems
such as fog and edge computing. As iterated before, a GORE paradigm consists of
distributed systems with the capability of managing high volumes of user requests.
It is thus essential that user privacy and confidentiality be maintained through all
communication channels, and unauthorized access to user data is prevented. Ensuring
such a high security assurance requires strong enforcement of rules.
In traditional computational models, policies were enforced based on a user’s roles
and content to which they are authorized to access. Recent researchers (Mansor et al.
(2012)) have attempted to develop innovative and adaptive policy based approaches,
but the levels of interaction taken into consideration are only between a user and
a server. They fail to account for multi-system interactions where policies not only
have to be implemented from a system to a user, but have to also be implemented
from a system to a system based on a user’s actions. Additionally, the techniques
for policy conflict detection being proposed in recent research (Wu and Liu (2010))
have attempted to resolve policy conflicts dynamically but fail to account for conflicts
between different interaction types of a system (Example: conflicts between applica-
tion level and the operational level of a system) which will be further discussed in
Chapter 4.
Traditional policy analysis and management models that we have analyzed (Bertino
et al. (2009)) were designed for a specific purpose: governing the accessibility and en-
suring privacy and security of systems and resources. However, with the introduction
of IoT, two additional factors: interoperability and share-ability of systems and re-
sources need to be taken into consideration while designing policy specifications and
frameworks. Chapter 4 will discuss detailed specifications and schema upon which
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our proposed policy management framework is designed and implemented.
Additionally, there exist numerous approaches related to policy management in
distributed computing environments (Teo and Ahn (2007)). There have been sig-
nificant advances in the area of policy conflict detection and resolution in relation
with network policy (Mansor et al. (2012), Wu and Liu (2010), Hu et al. (2013), Hu
et al. (2012)). The novel policy conflict and anomaly detection techniques coupled
with resolution strategies have been proposed (Hu et al. (2012)). However, given the
distributive nature of smart devices and the proposed computational architectures, a
more dynamic and robust policy management module is required where policy anal-
ysis will have the ability to detect policy anomalies and conflicts between different
interacting layers of a distributed system and dynamically resolve and provide a de-
cision to the end-user and a system.
The policy management module being discussed in this work is an intricate part
of the GORE architecture which will enable multi-tenant applications to be hosted
on this platform and enable proper management of resources assigned to individ-
ual applications in a heterogeneous system. Such policy management systems will
enable a fruitful interplay between multiple diverse ecosystems and end-user smart
devices, which is the end target goal of gateway-based computing architecture. Fur-
ther discussions on the requirements for policy analysis and its integration in a GORE
infrastructure are discussed in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 3
GATEWAY-BASED COMPUTATIONAL PARADIGM
As discussed earlier there is a need for a robust computational model with the capa-
bility to provision services on-demand to clients. These services include but are not
limited to networking, storage, and computing. Such a paradigm would need to be
situated at the edge of the network where IoTs meet the core cloud data center and
would need to be a decentralized infrastructure. Due to such diverse requirements, we
name such a paradigm as a Gateway-oriented Reconfigurable Ecosystem. Due to its
tendency to behave and serve as an entry point for communication requests, GORE
is envisioned to be a unique, dynamic, and robust infrastructure for smart device
communication.
The architecture being proposed is designed to be innovative and robust, keeping
in mind that it is not a replacement of the cloud model but rather an enabler, to
support the cloud in performing and provisioning services which it would not other-
wise have the capability to do. The model being proposed gives rise to a new era
of applications residing at the edge of the network that can proactively communi-
cate with IoT based devices with minimal latency. Furthermore, rather than storing
relevant and frequently used data in a centralized location such as a cloud infrastruc-
ture, applications will be designed to intelligently utilize essential information while
uploading the remaining data for long-term storage into cloud repositories.
A GORE infrastructure can be defined as a virtual-driven computing infrastruc-
ture with the capability to provision resources including computing, storage, and
network at the edge of the network on-demand while serving as an entry point be-
tween cyber-physical devices and the cloud computing model.
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Similar concepts to GORE have been proposed earlier, which include edge com-
puting and fog computing. Fog Computing ( Bonomi et al. (2012, 2014)) was designed
to seamlessly sit at the edge of the network and provide dynamic, real-time resources
to clients. Although our framework embodies certain aspects of the fog architec-
ture (Bonomi et al. (2012)), the GORE infrastructure is designed to accommodate
components of the fog architecture through fruitful interplay with core components
of our proposed architecture. In addition, the GORE infrastructure also introduces
unique components and modules to ensure security and collaboration of both data
and resources which would otherwise be absent in the fog computing model.
Given the close relationship shared between cloud computing and GORE, it is
essential to identify the uniqueness of our model. Our stringent analysis and com-
parison of current cloud computing models with our proposed GORE architecture,
reveals several factors that differentiates our work from other models. Such unique
factors are summarized as follows:
• A tiered organization involving multiple administrations in a multi-tenant en-
vironment.
• A hierarchical management and control, supporting interoperable distributed
computing environments and interplay with the cloud.
• A distributed and expanded mobility model to enable geo-distributed computing
capabilities.
• Geo-distribution of computational power with extensive focus on service local-
ization.
• Orchestration layer involving coordinated control in multi-tier architectural set-
tings.
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• Distributed policy management frameworks involving multi-tier policy sets and
rules.
This chapter will focus exclusively on our proposed architecture and introduce the
unique components of the GORE infrastructure which are considered to be differen-
tiating factors when compared with previously introduced computing models.
3.1 GORE Computing Architecture
The proposed GORE infrastructure is a multi-tier architecture involving multiple
components. The goal of this architecture is to develop a robust framework which is
easily programmable, is flexible, and can host a wide array of applications supporting
communication and collaboration over interoperable distributed environments which
would otherwise be impractical in a cloud environment.
The architecture proposed in this work as illustrated in Fig 3.1 is a triple-computational
service layer structure with a core emphasis on the middle layer. The prime focus of
this model is to support a policy-driven service provider for IoT-based devices. Our
generic approach toward the design of the GORE architecture enables it to be suit-
able for a diverse computing environment. Additionally, like the cloud architecture
we introduce the concept of multi-tenancy to support flexible usage of the GORE
infrastructure.
The concept of multi-tenancy has been utilized in the cloud computing model
and has proven to be a successful practice for conservation of resources. Multi-
tenancy involves the principle of virtualized resources being utilized by multi-client
organizations, all being hosted either on a single server or within the same data
center farm. The configurations for multi-tenancy involve the virtual partition of
data and services hosted on a single server but on separate virtual instances explicitly
utilized and maintained by a single organization. The GORE infrastructure brings
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Figure 3.1: GORE Architecture.
this concept to life through the capability for multi-applications hosting on a single
node in a GORE environment.
The following are the unique layers of the proposed GORE architecture as shown
in Fig 3.1:
1. Application Layer : A multi-tenant hosting environment where GORE-based
clients can host customized applications. Fig 3.1 illustrates a small portion
of a larger pool of applications that have the potential to be hosted on this
distributed system. The applications hosted at the edge layer are expected to
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deliver real-time data analytics to users on-demand, as well as interact with
the orchestration layer of the GORE architecture to determine relevant and
irrelevant data based on system and service usage.
2. Orchestration Layer : This layer is designed to be the most robust and dy-
namic component of the overall architecture. The orchestration layer consists
of multiple modules, and is responsible for analyzing and provisioning requested
services to users on-demand. A major contributing component to this layer is
the Policy Management Framework module. Additional components include a
Distributed Messaging Service for relaying messages between the orchestration
layer and its intended recipient, the Data Aggregation module which aggregates
all the provided data from IoTs and the cloud data center to provide intelligent
data analysis to the policy management module, and finally the Data API mod-
ule which is a tenant-oriented programmable component, customized to receive
and send data in formats recognizable by both IoTs and the orchestration layer
components.
3. Resource Interface Layer : To provide a flexible user experience for clients, the
GORE architecture also includes a third layer: a programmable interface. This
interface is designed to allow tenants to develop application-specific services that
support the application hosting layer. This ensures a secure communication
gateway is established between the application and the orchestration layer to
support optimal resource usage and service. This then allows for generic APIs
to be developed based on application and tenant requirements which will also
be supported by the connecting device.
A careful analysis of the three proposed layers concludes that the orchestration
layer is the most crucial component owing, to its robust components, and need for
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low latency realization. Therefore, our focus in this work elaborates on this layer
which additionally includes the policy management layer.
3.1.1 Orchestration Layer
As discussed previously, the orchestration layer is designed to function with mini-
mal latency. To enable such a realization, the following core modules are introduced:
1. Policy Management Framework : This module is responsible for maintaining
and governing the functionalities, communication, and distribution of data and
resources over heterogeneous environments, while maintaining the highest lev-
els of security through all layers of the GORE model. The policy management
framework in particular is designed to not only address access control and policy
governance of a GORE model but is extended to regulate the operations and
interactions of IoT devices with the system, including the data shared and mi-
grated within the entire GORE infrastructure. Chapter 4 will discuss in-depth
architectural details of this module along with concrete analysis techniques, con-
flict detection, and conflict resolution mechanisms utilized to reduce the risk of
both device and system security breaches.
2. Data Aggregation Module: This is the intelligent node of the whole framework.
The aggregation module can be customized by a tenant, or it can be a third
party tool which provides data massaging results based on the data provided by
IoTs and user related data pulled from an associated cloud data center. Data
aggregation goes through four different generic phases of data massaging. These
phases include probing the data for relevant information, analyzing the probed
data to classify, associate, and relate it to historically stored data, planning
the usage of data, including migration requests, and finally execution of the
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intended action and usage of data which involves relaying the data to either the
messaging service or the policy management framework for further analysis and
decision enforcement.
3. Data API : This module can be considered as a message translator between
the Data Aggregate and the Distributed Messaging Service modules. A simple
example to realize the usage of the Data API can be articulated as follows:
An IoT sends raw data to the GORE infrastructure system. Before receiving
the data into the Data Aggregation module, the Data API parses the data and
re-formats it into XML format for systematically parsing and analysis in the
orchestration layer. Similarly, once a Data Aggregation module completes the
data massaging process, the resultant intelligent data, which is then used to
pass a policy decision, needs to be relayed to the IoT. Then the Data API
converts the decision into an IoT acceptable format depending on the device
receiving the data. A metadata tag can potentially be used to identify the IoT.
However this depends on the IoT and tenant communication protocol which
requires establishment prior to the initial communication.
4. Distributed Messaging Services : This module serves as the point of entry for
the orchestration layer. Any request for access to applications, or requests for
data access must pass through this messaging service module. This service
module is responsible for receiving and sending data messages over a network.
IoT networking involves three major protocols, primarily 6LoWPAN, Routing
(RPL), and COAP. Although not discussed in detail, the messaging service can
relay messages over these networks to the Policy Engine and Data Aggregation
module. The messaging service does not make direct connections to the orches-
tration layer, but rather relays all communication through a Data API which
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converts the messages into the desired format for the engine aggregation.
Given the strong justification for elaboration of the orchestration layer, we equally be-
lieve that the Resource Interface layer requires close analysis and justification towards
its purpose.
3.1.2 Resource Interface Layer
The resource interface layer comprises of two sub-modules: API modules and
Resource modules. Each sub-module is interlinked to provide specific functionalities
to support the orchestration layer.
1. Application-oriented API : These are customized APIs developed by an appli-
cation owner utilizing a GORE infrastructure to host their application. These
APIs are application specific but ultimately are used to send messages/data to
the Orchestration Layer via the Distributed Messaging Service. The APIs are
developed to accept data from the IoT and relay them to the Orchestration
layer.
2. Gateway-based Virtualization APIs : These are GORE infrastructure based
custom APIs that are developed to be utilized by third party applications and
tenants in the GORE system. The APIs can be utilized to support a uniform
data aggregation cycle in the orchestration layer thus supporting the policy
management framework discussed in Chapter 4. The APIs allow the creation
of a pre-defined template that tenants could use to set-up an environment for
their applications to interact with the GORE infrastructure modules.
3. Resource module: It consists of computing, networking, and storage resources
which are provisioned on-demand based on the needs of the orchestration layer.
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The resource requests provisioned within the API are then loaded into the or-
chestration layer for further processing. The resource modules are developed as
independent nodes upon which a complete orchestration layer can be supported
or as supportive instances, providing resource support for the orchestration layer
nodes when resource demand is high.
Based on the activities expected to be performed in a GORE infrastructure, we
introduce two resources modules: Gateway Node (GN) and Gateway Instance
(GI). Each module is either a cyber-physical or virtual instance which together
contributes to the robustness of a GORE infrastructure.
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Figure 3.2: Gateway Node.
• Gateway Node: GNs are heterogeneous in nature which enhance their
adaptability to the orchestration layer. They have the capability to be
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Figure 3.3: Gateway Instance.
deployed in diverse environments and layers such as core, edge, access
network, or endpoint environments. They are defined as localized cyber-
physical access points from where IoT devices can request services (appli-
cations) and resources. The end outlook of GNs is the ability to inter-
communicate with adjacent nodes and diverse components in a GORE
architecture.
Fig 3.2 illustrates the inner workings of a Gateway Node. The orchestration
layer has the capability to reside within the GN and utilize the node for
resource and service provisioning. Finally, the performance and capability
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of the GN is dependent on its location with respect to an IoT device.
Thus, by programming a node as a cyber-physical system, we achieve geo-
distribution, localization and real-time data aggregation between a service
and an IoT.
• Gateway Instance: GIs are virtualized instances programmed to provide
computing, networking, and short term storage service to GNs dynamically
as required. They are programmed to behave as support nodes based on
resource requirements as illustrated in Fig 3.3. The supportive nature of a
GI enables it to provide on-demand resource support to GNs as required.
Additionally, GIs are also programmed to distribute resources dynamically
based on tenant requirements and application usage. Thus through the
creation of a chain of virtual GIs, the realization for a continuous support
of resources is maintained in a GORE infrastructure.
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Chapter 4
POLICY MANAGEMENT MODULE
Chapter 3 discussed the three unique layers of the GORE architecture with an em-
phasis on the Orchestration Layer. Given the number of interacting components in
the orchestration layer, primarily the policy decision engine, distribution messaging
services, data services, and data aggregation services, we believe that policy-based
services are a dominant component that requires in-depth analysis and development.
Fog Computing introduced several components in their middle-ware orchestration
layer (Bonomi et al. (2014)). These components included a foglet software agent,
distributed databases, policy-based service orchestration, and scalable messaging bus.
The policy-based orchestration framework discussed in their fog paradigm introduced
specifications from a very abstract perspective.
Their framework viewed policies from a business point of view but failed to take
into account distribution of policies based on stakeholders of their proposed computing
model. This implied that the policies did not have a specific schema which is essential
for a mature policy management framework. GORE architecture and its subsequent
policy management framework provides fine-grained policy orchestration along with a
defined schema for generating policy requests and subsequent rules which accomplish
the purpose of a secure and robust communication platform for accessing data and
applications across heterogeneous GORE environments.
The policy management module involves the presence of a decision making engine
that enables the policy-based orchestration framework to enforce policies based on
actual interactions in the system. Additionally, our policy module attempts to con-
centrate on intricate communication modules which will be discussed in this chapter.
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These modules make the GORE architecture unique.
4.1 Use-Case Scenarios: Smart Transportation Systems
To better understand and realize the proposed policy management framework,
use-case scenarios are utilized to motivate the robustness and interoperability of
GORE, along with the moving smart connected components which communicate with
a GORE infrastructure.
Our use-case scenarios are based on Smart Transportation Systems (STS). We
first demonstrate the role of GORE in supporting STS. STS are intelligent and adap-
tive systems that accommodate dynamic traffic changes and provide real-time traffic
information to travelers by considering potential conflicts and safety issues. A STS
environment contains diverse interacting components and each component requests
and provides multiple resources and data. Prominent components in a STS envi-
ronment include Smart Traffic Lights (STL), Connected Vehicles (CV), Emergency
Connected Vehicles (ECV), and pedestrian with smart devices. In the use-case sce-
narios of this work, STLs play an important role as GNs by relaying communication
data between other GNs and physical smart devices. STL can be considered as a
System of Systems of traffic lights in an urban transportation system. Based on the
components described above, we propose the following use-case scenarios:
Scenario 1: Bob leaves for work at 7:30 AM and is required to reach his office by
8:00 AM. His office address is stored in the GPS system linked to his CV. When
his CV approaches the first STL, it communicates with the STL and receives
an optimum route to its destination based on the estimated time of arrival. As
he approaches the next STL, based on the current traffic condition factoring
in his intended arrival time, the system will update the GPS with the same or
alternate route for the requested travel.
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Scenario 2: While Bob is on his way to his office, a firetruck, which is categorized
as an ECV, travels on the same route to respond to a reported emergency. This
ECV will provide the nearest STL with its final destination and by doing so, the
corresponding STL will also update Bob’s GPS to inform him of an approaching
ECV so that he could either prepare to pull over or be provided an alternate
route to avoid the ECV.
Scenario 3: A school bus travels to the designated school (eg. Tempe High
School) and on its route it makes multiple stops to pick up students, thus
affecting the traffic flow. The school bus will communicate its final destina-
tion with the first STL, and the STL will then notify all adjoining STLs of
the approaching school bus. Since its route is pre-determined, STLs notify all
connected vehicles of an approaching school bus and advise an appropriate pre-
caution. The current route is the same as Bob’s route and his GPS system will
warn him of an approaching school bus.
Scenario 4: Bob exceeds the speed limit and is fast approaching a STL where
a pedestrian is about to cross. The STL detects Bob’s CV and notifies him via
GPS of a probable collision detection. At the same time, the STL notifies the
pedestrian of an approaching CV and updates its traffic information to alert
adjacent STLs.
The above use-case scenarios help realize the effectiveness of a distributed edge-based
computing environment. While computing environments such as grid or cloud depend
on virtualization for all its resource allocation, the GORE infrastructure utilizes edge
network components such as 4G, LTE, WiFi, and other networking facilities to ensure
that uninterrupted communication between interacting components in their system
is maintained. Additionally, by sitting at the edge of the network in a geographically
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distributed environment, the resources are both physically and virtually distributed,
thus ensuring availability of services in regions where GORE architectures have been
deployed.
To effectively realize how the GORE architecture can handle these distributed
communications, we define a policy schema and associated definitions to design the
policy decision engine. This will help understand and measure the complexity of
the architecture and its capability to handle dynamic environments such as a Smart
Transportation System.
4.2 Policy Management Framework
To account for secure interoperability and accountability of users and services
in the GORE architecture, policy definition, collaboration, conflict detection, and
conflict resolution are key modules that require mature development and specification.
The policy management module is designed to reside in the orchestration layer of
either a GN or a GI.
Each smart connected device has the potential to generate policy requests based
on available credentials and submit the request to a GN. Each GN has a defined policy
definition with sets of rules, to allow device connection and information collaboration.
The policies are broadly categorized into the following requirements:
1. Network Management Policies
2. Operation Management Policies
3. Security Management Policies
The classification of policy requirements is necessary due to the heterogeneity of the
gateway nodes, making the achievement of collaboration a challenging task. Through
the classification of policies based on their different view points as specified above, an
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Figure 4.1: Policy Management Framework.
administrator can create policies and rules based on the three defined requirements
and store them into a policy repository.
The design of our policy management framework is distributive in nature with
each module able to be hosted on separate GI. This allows for the addition of more
modules in the future to enhance the framework based on the GORE architecture
development.
Fig 4.1 illustrates our proposed policy management framework along with all the
intricate components that contribute to its robustness. Currently our framework
consists of seven unique modules, and each module performs a specific function that
interrelates with other modules. Those modules are summarized as follows:
1. Tenant Applications : A dynamic list of uniquely identifiable applications hosted
on a GN. This list links to the access points of the listed applications once a
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decision of access or deny is made.
2. Policy Decision Engine: This module is designed to analyze a request from a
client and compare its presented entities against policies stored in the repos-
itory. An aggregated decision based on the data provided in the request and
its associated policy is made. The decision obtained from the policy decision
engine is then relayed to the enforcer module.
3. Application Administration: Intuitively, from its name the application admin-
istration is the back-end user-interface designed for admin access. Through
this interface, an admin can create and upload rules and policies specific to the
applications they own within a GORE environment. The created policies are
uploaded to the policy repository for access by the policy decision engine. Prior
to uploading, the policies are run through a conflict detection and resolution
program to parse through, detect and resolve any conflicting policies.
4. Policy Enforcer : The gateway that serves as the access point that grants or
revokes access to tenant applications based on the policy decision engine out-
come. The enforcer is meant to enforce a decision made by the engine and can
either reside within the policy management module in the GORE environment
or can also reside within the smart connected device.
5. Policy Resolver : The policy management framework adopts an attribute ori-
ented security resolution methodology towards identification of an interact-
ing component in a GORE infrastructure. The policy resolver authenticates
and identifies users attempting to connect to the GORE infrastructure either
through the GN or GI and, based on the set of attributes which they present,
validates their identity.
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The policy resolver consists of multiple sub-components to verify the identity
of the user based on their attributes:
• Attribute Finder : This module analyzes the set of attributes presented by
a user and queries the attribute database to determine the identity of the
user.
• Attribute Resolver : Once the identity is determined, it is sent for verifi-
cation to the attribute resolver to ensure its validity. Following that, the
valid identity is sent to the policy resolver.
• Attribute Database: A repository of user attributes identifying a users
access privileges against a requested resource.
6. Policy Resolver: Once the attribute resolution process is complete, the policy
resolver temporarily holds the identity of a user for when the decision engine
requires it, for aggregation and evaluation of a request.
7. Policy Repository: A secure repository consisting of rules and policies which
are referred to by the policy decision engine when required.
A crucial component in a policy management framework is the policy decision engine.
Validation, accessibility, authentication, and authorization are all determined within
this component which links to all subsequent components described previously. The
next sections will discuss a uniform specification and definition criteria for rules and
policies created for applications in a GORE environment.
4.2.1 Policy Definition
We define policies as a set of rules against which a client request is evaluated and
provisioning of services determined. Each policy consists of a set of rules which are
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defined by the following:
1. Rule id (Rule#): A unique identifier assigned to each rule created by an ad-
ministrator. The rule id enables the identification and detection of conflicting
rules.
2. Subject : Entities that request resources from a target. A Subject can either be-
long to virtual components (Gateway Nodes, Gateway Instances, or Cloud data
centers) or physical components (smart connected devices such as connected
vehicles).
3. Resource: Applications providing varied services dependent on the tenants host-
ing them. The GORE infrastructure allows for multi-tenant applications to be
hosted in a single gateway node, thus opening doors to a variety of applications.
4. Target : Entities that host applications within their systems. These entities can
host multiple applications to which subjects can submit requests for services.
5. Attributes : Unique identifiable entities that are associated with a device and
user. These entities posses unique properties that are exhibited by both virtual
and physical interacting components in a GORE infrastructure. More promi-
nently these properties are exhibited by access control entities such as actors,
targets, policies, or any applicable entity, where each entity has the capability to
exhibit self-defining characteristics which can be later utilized to identify them
(Rubio-Medrano et al. (2013)).
Key attributes in the GORE paradigm are:
• CUID: Component Unique Identity
• CType: Component Type
35
• CLoc: Component Location
• CDestination: Component Destination
• Current TimeStamp: Date and Time (HH:MM:SS)
• AuthCert: Authentication Certificate (Eg: X.509)
6. Action: Activity to be performed on the resource being requested. Recognized
actions in this policy definition include:
• Access: Ability to view data and resources pertaining to a requested ap-
plication.
• Update: Ability to edit data associated with an application owned by that
user.
• Migrate: Ability to move users data between different access point to pro-
vide better service provisioning to users on demand.
• Delete: Ability to remove data belonging to a particular user associated
with an application.
7. Effect: Result deduced from the evaluation of a rule in a policy. Permissible
effects in a GORE-based policy architecture include:
• Permit
• Deny
4.2.2 Policy Specification and Schema
The distributive nature of a GORE paradigm requires a uniform policy specifica-
tion, that can be utilized across heterogeneous platforms. Policy specifications will
formally define how the connecting devices and their hosting environments interact
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with the GORE infrastructure. The specifications also assist in defining a structured
taxonomy, utilizing common known terminologies in the area of policy analysis while
maintaining a unique specification tailored to the GORE paradigm.
To support a multi-tiered architecture while taking into account the different
points of policy enforcement, we have classify our policy specifications into three
unique categories:
Network Management Policies
These policies focus on maintenance of secure communication channels, network load
balancing, and network Quality of Service (QoS) requirements. QoS enables the quan-
titative measurement of service provisioning. It measures aspects of networking which
are essential for its continued, uninterrupted functioning such as error rates, band-
width, throughput, transmission delay, availability, and more. Network management
policies ensure that continued connectivity is maintained by all systems interacting
with smart devices in a GORE infrastructure. Additionally, network-oriented poli-
cies define networking provisioning constraints imposed on a GORE infrastructure.
These include constraints on the communication channels utilized by collaborators
and clients in communicating and sharing data over a distributed network.
A simple example would be: constraints on the IoT networking protocols defined
in a GORE system. There are three primary protocols designed for use by IoT based
devices. These protocols are: 6LoWPAN, Routing (RPL), and CoAP. If an applica-
tion hosted on a GORE platform is designed to communicate utilizing a 6LoWPAN
protocol, while the IoT-based device attempting to communicate with the application
is utilizing CoAP to relay data, network policies will be able to specifically identity
the communication protocol differences, and based on the application design, re-route
the smart device communication via the messaging services in the orchestration layer
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and allow for the conversion of the communication protocol to one compatible with
the application service.
Similar to the communication protocol example, further networking constraints
can be implemented to handle routing of data and to manage the load balancing of
the system so as to ensure equal distribution of resource usage. Additional services
that a network management policy could define include firewall policy services which
analyze the rules defined and check for conflicts, anomalies, and redundancy in the
defined rules, and finally network isolation policy services which focus on prevention
of network sharing in multi-tenant environments.
Operation Management Policies
Operational polices are designed to govern the functioning of systems and devices
along with their interactions. System functionalities include the type of services a
user should have access to, based on his security credentials. Functionalities could
also limit the type of services and information shared with users and migrated between
different gateway nodes and instances.
Operational policies involve multiple rules that cover a broad range of functional-
ities:
• Load Balancing Thresholds : policies that enable the managing of service loads
to ensure thresholds are not breached or exceeded. These thresholds include
the balancing of computing, networking, and storage resources within each GI
and GN of a GORE infrastructure.
• Device and Service Instance Configurations : policies that dictate the pre con-
figuration and management of services and devices. These policies define a
uniform template and help in creating an interoperable environment for GORE
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infrastructures.
• Service Attachments : policies defined by administrators, which when deployed
into GNs and GIs, have the capability to recognize and attach valid services to
user requests based on their credentials.
Security Management Policies
Policies that are exclusively enforced to dictate the security criteria that must be
met to enable secure collaboration and interoperability among distributed GI and
GN. These policies, similar to the networking and operational polices are well defined
based on the rule definitions discussed in Chapter 4.2.1. The goal and design of
security policies are to act as the first line of defense against unauthorized access
and usage of GORE resources. Therefore, certain security policies could potentially
intersect or overlap with either networking or operational polices, but will however
take precedence in the event of such an occurrence.
These policies involve rules covering a wide rage of functionalities. Two prominent
policies worth mentioning are:
• Security Multi-tenant Isolation: Multi-tenancy is the concept of hosting diverse,
unrelated tenants in a GORE infrastructure. For example, Google Directional
Services, and eHealth (Electronic Health Record) services are two separate ser-
vices owned by two different companies. However, both service applications are
hosted on the same GN. Security policies should be well defined to recognize
incoming requests, identify the tenant, and reroute requests to the particular
application without sharing confidential data from both the application and the
requester.
Within the application itself security policies will be defined to ensure user cre-
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dential verification and validation prior to application access and usage. Finally,
the security policy design should ensure policies and their subsequent rules pre-
vent devices and applications from accessing resources to which they have no
prior authorization.
• Security and Privacy : These policies generically focus on the delivery of data
protection across an application or enterprise. They involve the composition of
people, processes and technology that contribute to the prevention of unwanted
actions that could lead to destruction of data.
However, in our research, we further explicitly examine and define security and
privacy in terms of policies and rules. That is, the concept of security and
privacy is a composition of policies and rules that bind a user and his identity
to the data that accompanies his credentials while ensuring access to data being
requested is provisioned to the user through formal validation and authorization
of his credentials.
Our work will primarily focus on the combination of operational and security poli-
cies and techniques for detecting and resolving conflicts and redundancy occurrence
in a GORE environment consisting of customized policy definitions.
Schema
The proposed policy management framework described in Chapter 4.2 requires a well
defined policy definition supported by a mature schema. Given the multi level policy
specifications in Chapter 4.2.2, a schema is classified into: Data Schema, and Policy
Schema.
1. Data Schema: the first step toward defining a mature schema is the definition
of its attributes that define a component or user. The data schema is defined as
40
a set of attributes associated with both the physical (smart devices) and virtual
(GNs and GIs) components of the GORE environment. Listing 4.1 illustrates
a small sample definition of a data schema in terms of a Smart Transportation
System (STS) environment.
2. Policy Schema: Following the specification of a data schema, we are able to
construct a well defined policy schema, utilizing the attributes defined in a data
schema. A policy schema can thus be defined as conditions associated with
a requested action which, when satisfied, performs the requested transactions.
Our policy schema is structured to utilize XACML as the policy definition
language.
Listing 4.1: Data Schema Specification.
1 <?xml ve r s i on="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
2 <!--Document created by: Clinton Dsouza; Gail -Joon Ahn, SEFCOM -ASU -->
3
4 <Specification−1 Target="STL1.0" Requester="CV01" Resource="Authentication -Device
">
5 <Attributes Authentication="X.509" UUID="CV01" GPS−Lat="33.4545" GPS−Long="
-111.98787" Time="7:30:00pm">CV01
6 </Attributes>
7 </Specification−1>
8
9 <Specification−2 Target="FN01" Requester="STL1.0" Resource="Authentication -User">
10 <Attribute Security_Token="X.509" UUID="STL1.0" Location="Tempe,AZ" Time="7
:30:01">STL1 . 0
11 </Attribute>
12 </Specification−2>
13
14 <Specification−3 Target="FN01" Requester="FN02" Resource="Security -Data_Migration
">
15 <Attribute Security_token="X.509" UUID="CV01" Destination="Mesa,AZ" Origin="
Tempe,AZ" Target_Subject="FN02" FN02:Security_Token="X.509"
FN02:Destination="Mesa,AZ">
16 </Attribute>
17 </Specification−3>
4.2.3 Policy Analysis
With a clear definitions for policies, rules, and schema in Chapter 4.2.2, we can
now discuss the policy analysis techniques developed to support real-time user request
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evaluation and service provisioning. Additionally, we also discuss conflict detection
and resolution techniques for rules and policies defined by administrators for an ap-
plication.
While specifications give a clear classification of the types of policies, the schema
provides a well defined taxonomy that defines how policies are defined in a GORE
infrastructure. To perform fine-grained policy analysis on the requests and their
associated policies, and to further evaluate them for conflicts and anomalies, a sample
use-case study needs to be established. In Chapter 4.1, we defined four unique use-
case scenarios based on a Smart Transportation System and its interaction in a GORE
environment.
Utilizing, these scenarios, we define policies and rules based on three sample appli-
cations that we envision to be hosted in a GORE infrastructure: Direction Services,
User Profile Services, and Health Services. Let us consider use-case scenario 1 and
2: these scenarios revolve around a person’s travel from home to work and how the
integration with a STS environment would help him efficiently get to his destination
with minimal delays. During his travel, his route is intercepted by emergency vehicles
responding to an event in the vicinity. Based on the destination of the ECV and the
occurrence of the event, the person’s route is altered to the next efficient route with
minimal delay. Additionally, within the STS environment, Smart Traffic Lights are
able to provide the user with real-time event updates including notifications of when
an ECV is approaching his vehicle.
From a policy analysis perspective, in these use-case scenarios all three policy
specifications: network, operation, and security play a vital role in enabling collab-
orative communications in a STS environment components. However, we focus our
attention on policies related to security and operation. This helps in understanding
the role of policies and how they resolve any communication conflicts between mul-
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tiple smart connecting components. Table 4.1 illustrates a small set of rules that
would be created by an administrator of an application. For example, since we are
utilizing a STS environment as an example, the applications are traffic-oriented and
subsequently the rules developed are for traffic based applications. The Resource
defined in these rules are applications hosted in a GORE infrastructure. Each rule
specifies a set of conditions which we refer to as Attributes, that need to be met
so as to gain access to requested resources. The vital entities in these rules are the
Attributes, Action, Effects and Subject. Based on a user request each entity of a
rule is evaluated against the attributes presented in the request to validate the user
and the access privileges he is requesting.
Careful observation of these rules will show conflicts within themselves. For in-
stance: Rule 1 (r1) and Rule 2 (r2) conflict with each other, because they overlap in
time with a different Effect in place. Additionally, the Subject of r1 and r2 overlap,
thus adding another conflict occurrence between the two rules. Rule 3 (r3), Rule 4
(r4), and Rule 5 (r5) again overlap in time but with the same Effect. Because our
policy specification follows the defined XACML schema, we could utilize the Policy
Combining Algorithms (PCA) defined by XACML itself as a resolution methodology
(Rissanen (2013)).
However, the PCA defined by XACML only analyzes two rules at once, and can
only analyze one entity at a time. That is, we could direct XACML to perform a
Permit Override or a Deny Override which would only take into consideration the
effects of each rule but ignore the remaining entities. However, in r3, r4, and r5,
we have three rules where the entities are the same but the conditions displaying
the attribute time are different. This creates a complexity that is challenging for
XACML’s default algorithms to handle. Hence, there is a need for a more fine grained
detection technique that takes into account all the vital entities of a rule, as well
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as allows an administrator to specify his resolution preference in the event of rule
conflicts.
We utilize a policy-based segmentation technique as an approach to closely analyze
the rules. However, to understand and realize the effectiveness of this approach a well
formed representation of the policies and their rules are required. Binary Decision
Diagram (BDD) is a data structure that has been widely used for formal verification
and simplification of digital circuits (Hu et al. (2013)). We utilize BDDs as a method
for simplification of rules for easier verification and integration with our segmentation
approach.
Given the policy and rule definitions as illustrated in Table 4.1, it can be parsed
to extract vital information stored in the subject, target, resource, action, and effect.
This vital information contains attributes that are utilized to make decisions by the
policy decision engine. Once these attributes are identified, all XACML rules can
be transformed into Boolean expressions. Each expression is composed of Atomic
Boolean expressions combined with logical operators AND (∧) and OR (∨). The
atomic Boolean expressions are treated as either equality or range constraints de-
pending on the attribute values and definition. Because we have a structured rule
definition, atomic Boolean expressions can easily be derived based on the rules illus-
trated in Table 4.2.
Atomic Boolean Expressions: Consider rules r1, r2, r3, r4, and r5 from table 4.1.
In terms of atomic Boolean expressions, r1 can be represented as follows:
(Subject =“CV ” ∨ Subject =“ECV ”) ∧ (Resource =“HealthService”)∧
(CLoc =“MillAvenue&7thSt.”) ∧ (9 : 59am ≤ Current T imeStamp ≥ 6 : 00pm)
(4.1)
45
Atomic Boolean Expression Boolean Variable
Subject = “CV” S1
Subject = “ECV” S2
Action = “Access” A1
Action = “Update” A2
Resource = “Health Service” R1
Resource = “User Profile” R2
Attribute = “CLoc: Mill Avenue & 7th St., Tempe, AZ” Attr1
Attribute = “CLoc: McClintock Drive & Apache Blvd,
Tempe, AZ”
Attr2
Attribute : 1:00am ≤ Current TimeStamp ≥ 9:59am Attr3
Attribute : 9:59am ≤ Current TimeStamp ≥ 6:00pm Attr4
Attribute : 6:00pm ≤ Current TimeStamp ≥ 11:59pm Attr5
Table 4.2: Atomic Boolean Expressions and Corresponding Boolean Variables for
r1, r2, r5, r6.
Because Boolean expressions are derived from XACML policies and rules, there will
be situations where these rules overlap with respect to their attribute values and
their ranges. If the attribute values of two different rules are the same they are
assigned the same Boolean variable. However, if the attribute values are overlapping
ranges, the atomic Boolean expressions needs to be transformed into a new sequence
of expressions with disjoint value ranges. Hu et al. utilized a similar approach in
their policy conflict detection approach (Hu et al. (2013)) and we adopt the similar
principles in constructing our Boolean expressions from our defined rules.
Each Boolean expression for a rule is encoded as a Boolean variable as illustrated
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in Table 4.2 and as an example Subject = “CV” is encoded as S1. Utilizing these
Boolean variables we can construct a complete Boolean expression in terms of the
rules specified in Table 4.1.
Once again consider the rules in Table 4.1 The Boolean expression for rule r1 is:
(S1 ∨ S2) ∧ (R1) ∧ (Attr1 ∧ Attr4)
(4.2)
Similarly, the Boolean expression for rule r2 is:
(S1) ∧ (R2) ∧ (Attr1 ∧ (Attr2 ∧ Attr3)
(4.3)
Following the formal introduction and development of Atomic Boolean expres-
sions, the next step would be to define the BDD structures to represent the derived
Boolean expressions. BDDs are acyclic graphs which enable the visualization of the
previously defined Boolean expressions (Andersen (1997)).
Each non-terminal node in a BDD structure is representative of a Boolean variable
with two edges. Each edge has a binary label of a 1 for existent and 0 for non-existent.
The terminal node of a BDD represents either a True (T) or False (F) value.
Once BDDs are constructed for the defined rules, performing set operations, such
as unions, set differences, and intersections, which are required for our segmentation
approach, is easier to achieve. Fig 4.2 illustrates an example BDD structure for rules
r1 and r2, supported by a set operational function (∩) displaying the resultant BDD
structure.
Utilizing the derived atomic Boolean expressions and the resultant BDD structure,
a mature policy-based segmentation approach is used. Following the BDD represen-
tations illustrated in Fig 4.2, we now discuss the conflict detection and resolution
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Figure 4.2: BDD Representation of Rules Specification.
techniques that will be integrated into the policy management framework.
Policy Conflict Detection
Our conflict detection mechanism examines conflicts at the policy level, thus allow-
ing for a more fine grained resolution of conflicts. Conflicts at the policy set level
are handled by the policy combining algorithms which are defined by the XACML
definition (Rissanen (2013)).
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For example, consider use-case scenarios 1 and 2 described in Chapter 4.1. Five
CVs are approaching a STL and requesting for the same resource: Direction Service,
while an ECV is approaching the same STL and requesting the same direction resource
to respond to an emergency. In a STS environment, although ECVs are given priority,
a STL cannot drop a connection to a CV that is already being serviced. Based on
the administrative rules created for the direction services, an ECV is allowed access
to Direction Services throughout the whole day.
This creates the following situations:
• The administrator (admin 1), for ease of policy creations, assigned all CVs the
same access privileges as an ECV because the service is commonly utilized.
This leads to a scenario where an ECV has to wait for critical resources to be
delivered.
• A different administrator (admin 2) for the same application assigned shorter
time slots to the CVs, so as to ensure that ECVs are provided with essential
resources during peak hours. However, without either admin realizing it, the
policies specified by admin 2 conflict in time and effect with admin 1.
In Table 4.1, rules r3, r4, and r5 illustrate the above scenario and situations.
To address such situations, our detection algorithm focuses on the policy level to
perform fine grained rule analysis. Prior to our discussion of the conflict detection
techniques, we first introduce two new concepts that will assist in better understand-
ing of our conflict detection technique.
Authorization Space 1. Let Rx, Px be a set of rules and policies respectively of a
XACML policy x. An Authorization Space for a XACML policy component c ∈ Rx⋃
Px represents a collection of all policy components c to which all access requests
Qc from users can be applicable to.
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Attribute Space 1. Consider rules Rx in an Authorization Space of an XACML
policy component c ∈ Rx
⋃
Px. An Attribute Space for a rule Rx represents a
collection of unique attributes Attrx with overlapping, subset, or equivalent values.
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Algorithm 1: Identify Disjoint Conflicting Authorization Spaces of Policy
P
Input : A policy P with a set of rules (Rx)
Output: A set of disjoing conflict authorization spaces CSx with
associated attribute spaces for P
// Partition the entire authorization spaces CSx for P
// Create a new segment
1 S.New();
2 S ← Partition Policy(P);
// Create a new conflicting segment
3 CS.New();
// Add all rules associated with a segment
4 foreach s ∈ S do
5 R′ ← GetRule(s)
6 CS.Append(s);
7 Partition Policy(P):
8 R ← GetRule(P);
9 foreach r ∈ R do
10 sr ← AuthorizationSpace(r);
11 sra ← AttributeSpace(sr);
12 S ← Partition(S,sr);
13 return S ;
14 Partition(S, sr):
15 foreach s ∈ S do
// sr is a subset of s
16 if sr ⊂ s then
17 S.Append(s \sr);
18 s ← sr;
19 Break;
20 else
// sr is a superset of s
21 if sr ⊃ s then
22 sr ← sr \s;
23 else
// sr is equivalent to s
24 if sr == s then
25 S.Append(sr);
26 Break;
27 S.Append(sr);
28 return S ;
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Conflict Detection at Policy Level: Algorithm 1 illustrates the identification of
conflicting authorization spaces of a given policy P and the subsequent identification
of attribute spaces. Lines 9-12 partition the rules in a policy into authorization and
attribute spaces. While the conflict detection algorithm utilizes the authorization
spaces to detect conflicting rules, the resolution algorithm will utilize the attribute
spaces to resolve them. The basic functionality of the AttributeSpace() function is to
extract unique attributes from two or more conflicting rules in a given authorization
space. Following the extraction, the attributes are then evaluated to apply a suitable
resolution function, which is discussed in the conflict resolution portion of this work.
Algorithm 1 utilizes a function, Partition(), from lines 14-28 which accomplishes
the task of determining conflicting rules in an authorization space set. This function
works through the addition of an authorization space s derived from a rule to an
authorization space set S. In order to be categorized as a disjoint conflicting segment,
a pair of authorization spaces must meet one of the following relations:
1. subset - line 16.
2. superset - line 21.
3. equivalentmatch - line 24.
Lines 4-6 in Algorithm 1 helps identify conflicting segments. A set of conflicting
segments CS has the following properties:
• Pairwise disjoint: All conflicting segments are pairwise disjoint. A pairwise
disjoint set is a collection of sets where no two or more elements are shared
between the sets.
• Rules in any conflicting segments will have the effect of either permit or deny.
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r3
r5
r4
CS1 CS3
CS2
Figure 4.3: Disjoint Segments of Authorization Space for Policy P .
• Requests and Rule relation: Two different requests q and q′ that are evaluated
by rules within a conflicting segment (csi) should be matched by the same set
of rules.
We utilized a venn diagram as illustrated in Fig 4.3 to display the conflicting
segments and the associated rules within each segment. The venn diagram is one of
the many visual methods of displaying conflicting segments. However, even with the
visual representation of the rule segmentations, for an administrator, it is still difficult
to visually see which rules conflict with each other. Thus a grid representation is
utilized to view the rules and their associated conflicting segments.
To enable accurate interpretation of the results obtained from Algorithm 1, we
utilized a two dimensional grid representation approach to create an intuitive table.
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Figure 4.4: Grid Representation of Conflicting Segments CS for Rules r3, r4, and
r5.
Although, an XACML rule of a policy P contains multiple fields as illustrated in
Table 4.1, for purposes of easy understandability we utilize a two dimensional geo-
metrical representation of disjoint segments rather than a multi-dimensional one.
Fig 4.4 illustrates this grid representation of conflicts in policy P , where rules r3,
r4, and r5 represent three rules with conflicting segments. These segments are put
into one authorization space. A single rule can be common to multiple conflicting
segments. For example r5 is common to all three segments, while r3 is common to
segments 1 and 2. This grid representation approach helps in better understanding
the conflicting rules in a given policy.
Rules r3, r4, and r5 reflect the rules in Table 4.2. The grid representation thus
allows us to interpret the conflicts detected in these rules. As discussed earlier,
r5 is a common conflicting rule, and on closer examination will show that because
the rule has an effect of deny it conflicts with r3 and r4. Based on the use case
scenarios discussed earlier in this chapter, we observe that the conflicting rules create
a situation where an ECV is being denied access to resources during certain time
slots which conflicts with rules specified to allow continued access to an ECV. In
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addition to conflicting rule effects, there is also a conflict in their time range attribute,
which contributes the addition of rules to a conflicting segment and ultimately the
visualization of the grid representation.
Following our grid representation of rule conflicts, we discuss the efficient res-
olution of these conflicts based on both our proposed algorithm and administrator
input.
In a GORE architecture, all applications should be designed and managed by a
tenant, thus the administrator plays an important role in the design and enforcement
of policies for an application. It is therefore important to consider an administrator’s
resolution preferences, in the event that the created rules result in a conflict.
Policy Conflict Resolution
Resolution strategies can be enforced from two different perspectives: administrative
and application. The administrative policies are more static and definitive, and more
specifically, focus on determining the operations of an application in a GORE infras-
tructure. Our policy resolution techniques focus on the administrative perspective
of policy conflicts, as administrative policies are the primary reference points in the
policy management framework. Because administrators have a greater control over
the functionalities of an application, the resultant error on an administrators part
could potentially create a higher degree of data and application usage violations.
Our resolution technique requires the following criteria to be met:
• Policies should be specified utilizing the specifications designed in Chapter 4.2.1.
• Each policy should consist of more than one rule targeting resources owned and
allocated by a specific tenant in a GORE infrastructure.
• Policies should be compatible with XACML 3.0 request specifications (Rissanen
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(2013)). This implies that a user request q should be compatible for evaluation
against a supporting policy P .
Once the authorization spaces are determined along with the conflicting disjoint
segments, we can begin analyzing the authorization spaces and then further look into
the attribute spaces. Each attribute for a rule has a value which, along with the rule
effect, will be utilized in resolving conflicted rules.
Algorithm 2: Identify Conflicting Attribute Spaces and Resolve them Utilizing
Users Input and Set Operations when Rule Effects are the Same.
Input : An authorization space consisting of rules with same effect
Output: A set of non-conflicting rules for a policy P
1 choice ← UserChoice();
2 subject ← listofsubjectstochoosefrom;
3 AttributeSpace (sr):
4 foreach s ∈ S do
5 if sr ∈ S then
6 s.Attri ← GetAttribute(sr);
7 foreach r ∈ sr do
8 if ri.ID 6= rj.ID // where i 6= j
9 then
10 if ri.Effect == rj.Effect // When the effects of a rule are
the same
11 then
12 if ri.Attri == rj.Attrj then
13 rj ← Overwrite(ri);
14 else
15 if ri.Attri ⊃ rj.Attrj // Attributes of ri are a
superset of rj
16 then
17 rj ← Overwrite(ri);
18 else
19 if ri.Attri ⊂ rj.Attrj // Attributes of ri are a
superset of rj
20 then
21 ri ← Overwrite(rj);
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Algorithm 3: Identify Conflicting Attribute Spaces and Resolve them utilizing
Users Input and Set Operations when Rule Effects are Different.
Input : An authorization space consisting of rules with different effects and a
user input
Output: A set of non-conflicting rules for a policy P
1 choice ← UserChoice();
2 subject ← listofsubjectstochoosefrom;
3 AttributeSpace (sr):
4 foreach sr ∈ S do
5 if ri.Effect 6= rj.Effect // When the effects of a rule are NOT the
same
6 then
7 if choice == SubjectPriority(subject) // if the admins choice is a
"Subject Priority"
8 then
9 if ri.Subjecti == rj.Subjectj ∧ user.Attempt()== 2 then
10 SupersetOverride();
11 else
12 if ri == rj ∧ ri.Effect 6= rj.Effect then
13 PCA;
14 if ri.Subject 6= rj.Subject∧choice == ri.Subject then
15 rj ←Overwrite(ri);
16 else
17 ri ←Overwrite(rj);
18 else
19 if choice == SupersetOverride()// if the admins choice is a
"Superset priority"
20 then
21 if ri.Attri == rj.Attrj ∧ user.Attempt()== 2 then
22 SubjectPriority();
23 else
24 if ri == rj ∧ ri.Effect 6= rj.Effect then
25 else
26 PCA;
27 else
28 if ri.Attri 6= rj.Attrj then
29 if ri.Attri ⊃ rj.Attrj then
30 rj ←Overwrite(ri)
31 else
32 if ri.Attri ⊂ rj.Attrj then
33 ri ←Overwrite(rj)
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Algorithm 2 and 3 are designed to address resolution of conflicts detected in
Algorithm 1. Our resolution strategy primarily utilizes set operations to detect the
conflicts and administrative inputs, which are preferences to resolve conflicts. To
reduce the comprehensive complexity of the resolution algorithm, we split it into
two sections. The first section (Algorithm 2) refers to simple resolutions for when
the effects of rules in disjoint segments are the same. That is, rules within a single
authorization space have the same effect. The second section (Algorithm 3) focuses
on resolution of rules that have conflicting effects. That is, once an authorization
space set is determined, we analyze those authorization spaces with conflicting effects
to avoid cross-effect policy conflicts from being enforced. Therefore, Algorithm 3
addresses rules with different effects.
Additionally, due to the severity of having two similar rules with completely dif-
ferent effects, our algorithm allows the administrator to provide their preference in
the event that such anomalies are discovered. The administrator can provide two
preferences: Subject Priority — where a specific subject should be given higher prior-
ity over others and Superset Priority — where rules with larger attribute values are
determined to supersede, if it contains all the values of it’s conflicting effect-based
rules.
Algorithm 3 has certain functions which require clear definitions to understand
the fine grained resolution strategy of the algorithm:
• SubjectPriority(): This function accesses a list of all possible subjects that an
administrator can choose from, as their preference for subject priority.
• SupersetPriority(): This is an overriding function, which upon determining
the rule to be overridden, removes the redundant rule.
• Overwrite(): This is a function that removes an existing rule which is deter-
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mined to be redundant or no longer required, either through set operations or
via administrative preferences.
• UserChoice(): This is a function that accepts a user input in the form of a
subject that requires priority in the event of a rule conflict.
• PCA(): Represents a Policy Combining Algorithm that is pre-configured by
the the administrator when a rule is created. The PCA has four default rule
combining algorithms: Permit-Override, Deny-Override, Permit Unless Deny,
Deny Unless Permit (Rissanen (2013)). Our algorithm directs rules to a PCA
when the rules are the same but with different effects.
The result of the application of the resolution algorithm on the detected conflicting
rules r3, r4, and r5 provided an administrator with a policy consisting of conflict free
rules. Because in a STS environment, an ECV is determined to be of high priority
due to their role, an administrator would provide his subject priority preference as
“ECV”. Additionally, because r4 has a time attribute with a larger time slot in
addition to an ECV as one of its subjects, this rule will override rules r3 and r5. This
ensures, that the ECV is given a higher priority and unrestricted access to resources
it requires.
The implementation of the algorithms described above will accomplish an effective
conflict resolution solution for our robust policy management module. Our algorithm
not only takes into account the effects of a rule but also considers the attribute values
held within each rule, because these values are essential toward the validation of a
user’s request against an admin-specified policy.
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Chapter 5
IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
Having discussed the architecture of a GORE infrastructure and the different com-
ponents that contribute toward its efficient functioning, we developed a test-bed that
embodied and emulated the functionalities of a GORE architecture. This test-bed is
a near-realistic implementation of a Smart Transportation System environment. We
define Smart Transportation Systems as advanced systems and applications hosted on
either moving or fixed infrastructures that assist in efficient, robust and safe manage-
ment of traffic systems, making them more coordinated, responsive, and “smarter”
to use in a dynamic transportation environment.
A STS is a small component of a bigger plan for a Smart City which consist of
mobility networks, smart grids, energy networks, urban analytics, smart buildings and
electronic and social networks. A STS within itself has multiple moving components:
vehicles, pedestrians, traffic lights, rail-road signals and more. Each component is
considered to be “smart”. This indicates that these components are either connected
or contain devices that can connect to the Internet and upload, share, or migrate
data to servers or among themselves.
The US Department of Transportation (DOT) has long been conducting and sup-
porting research in the area of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) which is
equivalent to a STS environment. Their research spans a cross-domain area of phys-
ical structures and software architectures. Primary research areas of ITS include:
safety, mobility, environment, road weather, policy, connected vehicle technology,
automated vehicle research, and other supportive resources to assist in efficient func-
tioning of a deployed ITS environment (DOT (2014)). Among the primary research
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areas determined by the US DOT we believe connected vehicles and policy are relevant
areas to out work.
Policies can be viewed from different perspectives and so can their implementation
and enforcement. While the DOT views policies from an infrastructural and business
perspective, we view policies from a more system and user perspective. That is, our
policy specifications and definitions in Chapter 4.2 focus on governing the accessibility
and operations of users and services in a STS environment.
By definition, a STS requires a robust system that can handle large quantities of
user requests while communicating in a distributed environment over heterogeneous
networks. Given the number of devices sharing information in a STS environment,
a cloud model for service provisioning would be challenging to implement due to
the centralized design of cloud computing. However, utilizing GORE as the median
between the smart devices and the cloud would serve as an efficient buffer. GORE,
being situated at the edge of the network, boosts application distribution and resource
share-ability. Additionally, the policy management framework implemented for the
orchestration layer of a GORE infrastructure is designed to handle large quantities
of user request for validation and provisioning of requested services. This will prove
to be an essential component in a STS environment where users are continuously
interacting with the transportation infrastructure.
Our STS test-bed design and implementation closely resembles the intentions of
an ITS environment envisioned by the US DOT. Additionally, the test-bed enables
the evaluation of the implemented policy management framework in an environment
closely resembling a GORE architecture. Finally, the test-bed displays the realization
of the STS environment requirements through the utilization of GORE infrastructure
and its internal policy management framework.
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To efficiently evaluate the potential of the test-bed and its performance, we utilize
a metric-based evaluation system. The primary criteria of this system is time. The
GORE infrastructure boasts a near real-time provisioning of services as one of the
many requirements. The measurement of real-time service provisioning is achieved
through the calculation of the time it takes to achieve various functionalities both
within the GORE architecture and the supporting systems. Utilizing time as the
quantifiable component in the system, we determine two unique metrics that are
crucial in evaluating the performance of the test-bed:
• Conflict Detection and Resolution performance (metric 1): This metric is specif-
ically designed to analyze the performance of our proposed conflict detection
and resolution algorithm from an administrative perspective. The performance
evaluates the time it takes to find all conflicting segments and rules from a set
of policies created by an administrator for a specific application and the time
taken to resolve them.
• Policy Resolution and Enforcement performance (metric 2): This metric evalu-
ates the time it takes for a server to receive a request, followed with analyzing,
evaluating, and generating a response for that request. This metric measures
the performance of the decision engine, thus providing valuable insight into the
performance of our proposed policy management framework.
• Attribute Resolution performance (metric 3): This metric provides a fine-grained
insight into one of the six unique sub-modules of the policy management frame-
work. This metric displays the effectiveness of the policy resolver, more specifi-
cally the attribute resolver which identifies a user based on their request against
credentials previously stored in the gateway instance database. The resulting
time displays the effectiveness of a resolver in validating users, prior to deter-
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Figure 5.1: Abstract View of the Test-bed.
mining their accessibility to requested services.
Utilizing the above mentioned metrics, the evaluation portion of this Chapter analyzes
the policy management framework and the overall system performance of this test-bed
while providing vital results for scientific interpretation with regards to the efficiency
and usefulness of adding a policy management module to a GORE infrastructure.
5.1 System Design
The STS test-bed was designed utilizing a combination of different technologies,
devices and infrastructures. Each component of the test-bed can be classified into
layers where each layer is designed to perform a certain functionality. Figure 5.1
illustrates the three layers of our test-bed:
1. Layer I : Consists of what is known as the cloud data center. We utilize an
OpenStack cloud computing infrastructure to create a centralized intelligence
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environment that can host instances consisting of STS application data and user
uploaded data. The infrastructure also hosts a front-end UI that a user could
interact with to study the functionalities of the implemented test bed. Finally,
the cloud data center also hosts an administrative interface where administrators
can develop policies for their specific GORE-based applications which can then
be uploaded to the GORE environment.
2. Layer II : Consists of the core components of our work. Primarily, layer II is
the GORE infrastructure (including the gateway nodes), which we proposed in
Chapter 3, inclusive of the policy management framework proposed in Chap-
ter 4. Current technology limitations, which mainly is the construction of
a semi-virtualized networking device with the capability to host applications
while providing networking and communication capabilities to these hosted ap-
plications, led us to create a semi-realistic GORE infrastructure. To achieve a
semi-realistic environment, we employed the use of Raspberry Pi’s which are
ARM-powered single board computers that provide us with the hardware ca-
pability to host applications and also provide networking capabilities either
through web interfaces, Bluetooth connectivity, or ZigBee connected devices.
Finally, we utilized web-based interfaces connected to databases hosted on the
OpenStack cloud to achieve both the near-real time requirement and the dis-
tributive nature required for a robust GORE infrastructure.
3. Layer III : This layer is the actual connected vehicular environment where smart
devices communicate with the GORE infrastructure. These devices generate
requests for services and utilize the obtained data to make intelligent decisions.
To achieve this connectivity, we utilized Android-based smart phones loaded
with a GPS tracker application that keeps track of the user position as well as
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uploads the user position along with unique identifiers to the cloud data center
from where the GORE-based components can analyze and perform intelligent
computation to assist the user.
Once the complexity of the test-bed is realized, we can further expand on the core
components in Layer II of the test-bed.
5.2 Test-bed Implementation
The preliminary test-bed not only focuses on the policy decision enforcement but
also on the emulation of a STS based on the use-cases detailed in Chapter 4.1. The
test-bed utilizes the Google Maps API for displaying alternative routes as well as
real-time route of the user. On the user-end we designed a mobile application that
collects user data within a specific time interval. The collected data is stored in a
database to be later used for data aggregation. The mobile application also has an
added feature that allows a user to enter in the final destination similar to how a
GPS device works. Once the final destination is entered, the application sends the
device location and final destination to the database, based on the users time interval
preference.
When a user provides his final destination, the web application determines a list
of alternative routes. As the user approaches a STL, his route changes based on
updated traffic information that the STL receives. The STL plays the role of a
Policy Enforcer where all necessary policy decisions are routed to the STL for the
enforcement on either a CV or a pedestrian. The policy management framework has
been also implemented with key elements introduced in Chapter 4. To support policy
enforcement capability in our implementation, we utilized ARM-based computers
called Raspberry-Pi, which can be emulated to behave as STLs and thus behaves as
policy enforcement points. In addition, a generic policy decision engine is built based
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on Balana WSO2 opensource policy implementation. 1 The test-bed consists of six
Policy Decision Engine
Policy Enforcer
Policy 
Repository
OpenStack Instances
Raspberry- Pi
Policy Administrator
Front End-UI STL
Google Direction Service:
Routing Information
Android Application
(CV)
User Information Database
Collect data
Send user data
Upload Policies
Aggregate data
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Figure 5.2: Test-bed Architecture.
main components:
1. User UI : is the front-end display which a user can use to view his current
position and get alerts on policy decisions that are pushed to his device.
2. Collection Data Container : is a data object which consists of road informa-
tion such as traffic delays, road closures, and current road usage by emergency
vehicles.
1The Balana source code was customized to serve the purpose of an STS environment. Original
code can be found here: https://github.com/wso2/balana
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3. Google Directions Services : are third-party services which are utilized to obtain
multiple possible routes based on the data being collected in the collection data
container.
4. STL: are semi-virtual GNs designed to provide computation, networking and
storage capabilities to users and handle requested services. Within the STL
resides the policy decision engine wherein all requests for access are evaluated.
The Policy Decision engine is the core module of the STL and is vital to the
functioning of the test-bed.
5. Connected Vehicle: is a smart vehicle completely controlled by the user which
establishes secure communication with STLs and generates requests for services.
6. Policy Administrator : The back-end UI that an administrator accesses to create
policies for a GORE application.
7. Policy Decision Engine: The core component in the GN that performs data
aggregation and makes a decision.
Also, we utilize and configure the instances in a single OpenStack project to simulate
GIs and host the primary web application. The GIs can also behave as supportive
services when the GNs run out of memory.
5.3 Policy Decision Engine Design and Implementation
The policy decision engine resides within the GORE infrastructure, as illustrated
in Fig 3.1 of Chapter 3. Because a GN is designed to host applications for access
by smart connected devices, a Raspberry Pi in our test-bed is considered to be a
GN. Therefore, our policy decision engine resides within the Raspberry Pi. However,
as with any application, there is an administrative view required to manage the
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Figure 5.3: Policy Decision Engine Implementation.
application. The administrative view to the policy decision engine is a policy editor
through which policies can be created and exported. This policy editor is configured
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and implemented utilizing an opensource WSO2 Identity Server 2 . The identity
server allows for the configuration of a policy editor to customize it specifically for
the development of STS related policies.
Fig 5.3 illustrates the completed connection between the administrative console
and the policy management module hosted on the Raspberry Pi.
• Administrator Console: As discussed earlier, the administrator console enables
the administrator to enter policies related to a STS application hosted in a
GORE infrastructure and export it directly to the policy management module
on a GN. Additionally, the administrator console also consists of a policy conflict
and resolution module that analyzes the administrator-created XACML policies
for conflicts and resolves them. In addition to automated conflict resolution, the
module also allows an administrator to provide his preference as to the type of
resolution they would prefer to resolve conflicts. Once the conflicts are resolved
the policies can be exported to the Raspberry Pi.
• Policy Management Module: This module is hosted on the Raspberry Pi as
part of the GORE architecture. The policy management framework discussed
in Chapter 4 is the core intelligence of the GORE architecture. All policies
exported by the administrator are stores in the Policy Information Point (policy
repository), which the decision engine can access whenever a request is made.
A policy request is generated from any smart connected device in the STS
environment. In this case, the front-end UI sends requests for access to an
application hosted on the GN. In our test-bed the “Direction Services” is an
application that routes a connected vehicle to its fastest route based on traffic
conditions.
2A product of WSO2, an open source platform: http://wso2.com/products/identity-server/
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The decision engine evaluates a user request against the policies created by the
administrator. Based on the credentials (attributes) presented in the request,
the decision engine utilizes a policy-attribute resolver to determine the validity
of the request. Once the validity is determined, a decision of permit or deny is
issued, which is then enforced by the Raspberry Pi or the connected vehicle.
5.4 Policy Engine Evaluations
Evaluation of the policy decision engine is a complex process involving the com-
bination of multiple components in the test-bed. The evaluation process is assessed
from two perspective:
• Administrative perspective: which involves assessing the performance of the
policy conflict and resolution module hosted on the administrative console.
• System perspective: which involves assessing the performance of the policy
decision engine hosted on the Raspberry Pi as part of the GORE infrastructure.
5.4.1 Administrative-Level Policy Conflict Detection and Resolution Evaluation:
Metric 1
The design of the administrative console is based on the WSO2 Identity server. A
GI is created to host the administrator console. The GI for this test-bed is a virtual
Windows 7 instance. Once the identity server is created, a user can log-in and create
application- specific XACML rules and policies. Once the policies are created they
are exported to a folder and then analyzed for consistency.
The analysis of these rules is in accordance with the algorithms defined in Chap-
ter 4 (Algorithms 1, 2, 3). A custom policy conflict detection and resolution Java
applet was developed which contains the algorithms developed for the policy man-
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Assessment No. of Rules Time (ms)
1 165 48
2 195 57
3 225 128
4 255 135
Table 5.1: Metric 1: Policy Conflict Detection and Resolution Time vs Number of
Rules.
agement module. Algorithm 1 analyzes the rules in all policies and determines the
conflicting segments. Algorithm 2 and 3 analyzes all the specifications or entities
in a conflicting rule and resolves the conflicts through removal of the conflicting or
redundant rule.
The design of the Java application is such that, once the folder containing all the
exported policies and rules are connected to the application, the conflict detection
and resolution occurs simultaneously. Table 5.1 illustrates four unique evaluations of
the policy conflict detection and resolution algorithms. Utilizing the specifications in
metric 3, we evaluate the time the program and its implemented algorithms take to
analyze the rules and detect all possible conflicts while resolving them.
It is also important to note that with every assessment increment, the complexity
of the rules increase. The complexity was introduced in forms of rule redundancy,
effect, attribute, and subject conflicts. This was done to evaluate the stability and
efficiency of our conflict detection and resolution algorithms. The overall performance
of the program was deduced to be stable with time increasing as the number of rules
did. Even with the increase in time, the maximum being 135 milliseconds (ms),
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Figure 5.4: Conflicting Rules Detection.
the program was still able to efficiently detect and resolve conflicts in under 200
ms, which compared to the policy decision engine, is still on-par with the overall
evaluations conducted in the test-bed.
Given the complexity that an administrator can introduce in an application’s
policies, our algorithm takes into consideration their preference for resolution as well.
We provide the administrator with two choices: Subset Priority or Subject Priority.
These two resolutions are taken as inputs in our algorithm while resolving the conflicts.
We introduced 12 policies with 15 rules each for our assessment. Fig 5.4 illustrates
the obtained conflicting segments and the rule names. The red box illustrates actual
conflicting rules on our test-bed. We selected “Subset Priority” as an administrator
preference. In this case Rules 26 and 40 are conflicting due to a subset clash. This
means that two or more values in a single entity column of the rules are conflicting
with each other.
Our console allows the administrator to view the two rules so that he can determine
what the conflicting values are. Fig 5.5 illustrates the console view of two conflicting
rules. The red boxes indicate the conflicting values. As can be observed, there
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Figure 5.5: Detailed View of Rule Conflicts.
are two unique columns in a rule that are conflicting. In this case, the “Subject”
and “Attribute” are the two rule entities that have conflicting values. Because the
administrator has provided his preference of a subset priority, our algorithm will
analyze the attribute conditions of each rule and determine which rule covers a broader
condition. If the administrator had provided his resolution preference as “Subject
Priority”, our algorithm would give preference to the rule containing one subject
with “EV” as its value. Utilizing this custom developed console, an administrator
can ensure that the rules created for an application in a GORE infrastructure are
conflict free. Once the conflicts are resolved, the console allows the administrator to
push the rules directly into the GN to be stored in the policy repository of the policy
management module.
5.4.2 System-Level Policy Enforcement Evaluation: Metrics 2 & 3
Table 5.2 is an evaluation of the average policy enforcement time in a smart
transportation system against the number of vehicles interacting in the system. This
evaluation covers the first metric discussed earlier (metric 2). Successful evaluation is
based on the completion of the following workflow connectivity: A CV approaches a
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Assessment# Average Enforcement Time (ms) Number of Vehicles
1 115 1
2 419.5 2
3 868.5 3
4 1050.5 4
Table 5.2: Metric 2: Policy Enforcement Time vs Number of Vehicles.
STL and requests for a particular service (direction service in this use case scenario).
The STL takes the user request and sends it to the policy decision engine hosted in
the GN. The STL could function as a standalone GN or a node, in a cluster of STLs
communicating with a separate network-enabled device functioning as a GN. Once the
request is evaluated by the policy decision engine and a decision made, it is enforced
by the STL onto the connecting vehicle. The decision could range from a simple
comment such as a permit or deny, or could be more complex such as warnings or
instructions informing the connected vehicles about changes in their commute times
or other emergencies in their surroundings.
Our evaluation shows that the increase in the number of connected vehicles does
effect the enforcement time, however, the difference does not significantly reduce the
performance of the engine. We observe a minimalistic 20% increase in enforcement
time when a maximum of 4 vehicles are communicating with a single STL in the
system up from 3.
The design of our system allows us to perform fine-grained evaluation of even
the smallest component of our policy management framework. For example, a key
sub-module in the policy management framework in the policy resolver, which is an
attribute resolver that validates user credentials to determine access to the services
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Assessment Average Attribute resolution Time (ms) Number of Vehicles
1 3 1
2 7 2
3 12 3
4 16 4
Table 5.3: Metric 3: Attribute Resolution vs Number of Vehicles.
being requested. Due to the distributive nature of our policy management framework,
we have the capability of evaluating the attribute resolver (metric 3) from the time a
request containing a users credentials is received to when they are verified.
The average time the attribute resolution module takes to resolve a request and
identify if the user making the request is validated is illustrated in Table 5.3. As
can be observed, the average time for resolution increases with the increase in load
on the GN, however, the increase is in milliseconds. When a maximum number of
four vehicle are connected to the same STL requesting for services, there is a 33.3%
increase in resolution time, however considering the time increments is in milliseconds,
there is no significant performance degradation.
5.5 Test-bed Performance and Evaluation
The complete test-bed evaluation involves the performance calculation of a com-
bination of multiple components across a heterogeneous infrastructure and systems.
The test-bed evaluation begins from when an administrator uploads a set of appli-
cation policies into the policy management module. What follows is the workflow
criteria established for the overall complete evaluation of our test-bed.
Once policies for a particular application are uploaded, they are stored into a
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Assessment# Average Decision time (ms) Number of Vehicles
1 589 1
2 1887.5 2
3 3419 3
4 4149.25 4
Table 5.4: Total Policy Decision Time vs Number of Vehicles
policy repository. The policy repository contains all policies that an administrator
creates and uploads. When a user connects to an STL, his smart device generates a
request in XACML and sends it to the STL. In our test-bed, the STL is a GN hosting
the policy decision module. Once a request is received, the policy decision engine first
calls the policy resolver which extracts the attributes of the user from the request and
compares it with the values stored in a remote database in a GI. Once verified, the
user’s request is evaluated against policies stored in the policy repository based on
the request and service type. Once the policy decision engine evaluates the request,
a decision is generated which is then sent to the policy enforcer for enforcement. The
policy enforcer pushes the final decision to the user. Based on the decision pushed, the
user makes the necessary changes thus completing a successful secure communication
in the GORE infrastructure.
Upon the establishment of this workflow, the performance is calculated as the
total decision time from when a request is sent to when a decision is made in the GN
versus the number of vehicles in the system.
The overall test-bed performance is condensed and illustrated in Table 5.4. As
expected, with the increase in the number of vehicles the average decision time also
increases. This is attributed to the number of requests begin generated and sent to
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Figure 5.6: Visual Performance Evaluation of Test-bed.
a single STL. However, the final assessment with four vehicles shows a 20% increase
from three vehicles, which is not a significant impact to performance. However the
total decision time reaches approximately 4s, which indicates that the test-bed is
achieving a near-real time communication between the smart traffic lights and the
connected vehicles but is still not achieving a complete real-time workflow.
Finally, to better understand the performance of the test-bed under varying system
and user loads we utilize intuitive charts as illustrated in Fig 5.6. Through the
varying evaluations conducted on the implemented test-bed, we are able to prove that
the GORE architecture proposed in this work is capable of providing a robust and
efficient infrastructure for secure collaboration and communication of data between
IoT devices and its connecting applications. Additionally, the policy management
module proposed in this work does enables the GORE infrastructure to function at
an optimal level while maintaining a certain level of security and ensuring that user
77
credentials are validated prior to servicing their requests. With the support of the
designed policy management framework, our test-bed is capable of accomplishing
these objectives while maintaining a high performance rate and ensuring users are
provisioned with validated services within seconds.
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Chapter 6
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
The GORE model like Fog computing (Bonomi et al. (2012)) is still a very preliminary
model that requires more maturity and supportive infrastructure to enable the realiza-
tion of an edge-based infrastructure. In January 2014, CISCO announced the release
of a new range of networking infrastructure which they called Cisco IOx. These were
programmable routers with the capability of supporting an operating system within
the router itself, thus enabling the virtualization of resources and enabling the hosting
of applications (Cisco (2014)). However, the final product has not been released as of
this writing. The specifications for an IOx device closely resemble our specifications
for a GN, thus leading us to believe that the realization of a GORE infrastructure
is a viable option that will be pursued by the industry in the future. Based on the
contributions in this work, there are two areas of research in which future work can
be pursued: the GORE architecture model and the policy management framework.
6.1 Discussion
Prior to discussing the potential future work that can be pursued in the area
of GORE and policy management, we will first discuss the current limitations of
our approach and points of consideration that need to be taken into account when
pursuing future research in the area of edge networking paradigms.
The current focus of this work has been on proposing a policy management frame-
work that will enable connected devices to coherently communicate and request for
services from applications being hosted in a GORE infrastructure. However, our ap-
proach does not take into account the authentication and authorization of users to
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avoid identity spoofing in the GORE infrastructure. Although our attribute reso-
lution validates a request, there are no security checks that enable the detection of
malicious attacks such as, attempts at user impersonation to access sensitive data.
Our approach assumes that a user would not attempt to impersonate another user,
and the security measures that we implemented ensured that access to resources that
are being requested is first validated prior to assignment. This ensured that the com-
munication and sharing of data is completed meaningfully through the evaluation of
related policies in the decision engine.
In addition to these security checks, we also need to address the issue of low
latency. As observed from our evaluation, we were able to achieve a near-real time
communication. However, this can be further enhanced through the utilization of
advanced communication layers such as SPDY or the HTTP 2.0 protocol. SPDY has
proven to be an effective communication protocol in the transport layer of the OSI
model and can potentially be utilized as a method to wrap communication requests
and responses between vital components in the policy management framework. The
design of this protocol was primarily to enable low-latency transport of data over the
web (Belshe and Peon (2012)).
Finally, an important area for future exploration that needs to be looked into from
a STS perspective is the hardening of security on STLs. STLs are basically GNs and
are the primary point of contact for connected devices to request for provisioning
of services. This makes them an attractive target of attack from a malicious user’s
perspectives. Therefore, an effective threat mitigation model needs to be developed
to ensure that in the event of an attack on a STL, protocols are put in place, to ensure
continuity of a STS environment is not compromised.
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6.2 GORE Computing Model Enhancements
The GORE architecture is designed to contain independent modules that can be
loaded into the system to behave as part of the system. In our GORE architecture,
we defined a policy management module which is considered to be a small component
for ensuring secure communication and collaboration. However, our work does not
cover additional security modules that need to be developed to further secure the
architecture. Thus, future work in this area could involve the development of a
security service module for a GORE environment. Each GN and GI will host a
complete or a fraction of a security module, depending on its configurations and
requirements of the infrastructure.
A security service module could potentially consist of services such as: Policy
Management framework and life-cycle management, Secure communication encryp-
tion, Intrusion Detection, Identity Management, and User entitlement services. Each
of these services, although specified to be within a single security module, have the
capability of being hosted as independent modules thus making the security service
module a flexible future development for the GORE architecture.
Another interesting and challenging area of future work in the GORE architec-
ture is a health detection system. Currently, the GORE architecture is designed to
be distributive in nature based on a geographical location. However, the current
architecture does not contain services or modules to monitor the health of a GN or
GI in a distributive environment. Our architecture can, however, monitor resource
usage and is capable of handling resource loads (load balancing) based on the policy
management module and its specified networking and operational policies.
The health monitoring service would need to dynamically monitor GNs and GIs
in its vicinity and have the capability to take over the functioning of a GN or GI
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or spawn a new GN or GI in the event of a node being compromised or temporarily
being put out of service due to system failure or a cyber-attack. This will enable the
GORE architecture to function as a self-sustaining architecture with the capability
of supporting and spawning nodes and instances in the event of an attack on systems
in a certain geographical area.
6.3 Policy Management Framework Enhancements
The policy management framework discussed in Chapter 4 provides well defined
specifications for the policies and rules created in a GORE environment. Furthermore
the rules and policies are classified based on their types into: Operation, Security and
Networking. This provides us with a multi-layered policy structure for when they are
stored in the Policy Repository.
However, in a GORE architecture, the entire infrastructure consists of three dis-
tinct layers: the core, which is primarily the cloud data centers, the edge, which
is the GORE environment; and the physical layer, consisting of IoT devices. Each
one of these layers has specific policies that require enforcement. Our current policy
approach takes into consideration all three layers but combines their policies into
three policy requirements: Operation, Security and Networking. While these policies
are relatively static in nature and are analyzed to a fine-grain level by our policy
framework, we believe future work in this area would be the further classification
of the rules and policies. That is, utilizing a three-pronged approach of classifying
the policies into virtual, tenant, and client, where the virtual policies focus on rules
determined to be issued for the centralized cloud data centers, the tenant policies are
specified for a specific application hosted on the GORE architecture, and, finally, the
client rules are those concerned with IoT device communication with either the cloud
or GORE infrastructure. Utilizing this approach, a multi-dimensional policy struc-
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ture could be created through which a more robust conflict detection and resolution
algorithm can be produced.
Finally, a realistic future work that would enhance the current policy manage-
ment framework would be the inclusion of a dynamic policy generation module that
would continuously evaluate the GORE infrastructure and its resources, usage, and
functionalities, and generate policies to better manage the GORE environment and
its communication infrastructure. David Putzolu (Putzolu (2003)) patented a unique
technique for dynamic policy generation for network management systems utilizing
instruction generation based on network condition evaluation. These instruction are
policies which are then installed on the network devices within the network manage-
ment system. Because this concept only focuses on policy-based network management
systems, future work would involve the development of dynamic policy generation for
other previously classified policy types in the GORE architecture.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
This work proposed two new concepts that are intended to enable the Internet
of Things based devices to communicate more securely, efficiently, and robustly in
a dynamic environment. The first concept utilized the notion of edge-networking.
We proposed a computing architecture that would reside below the cloud but above
the IoT devices. Our architecture boasts characteristics such as homogeneity in a
distributed environment, on-demand access, low latency servicing, and geographical
localization of services. Additionally, the architecture is proposed not as a replace-
ment but as a support infrastructure to enable the cloud computing model to provide
services which it would otherwise not be capable of provisioning. We call this archi-
tecture: Gateway-Oriented Reconfigurable Ecosystems.
Within the GORE architecture, we identified various security requirements that
would need to be accomplished to ensure secure communication and collaboration.
From these security criteria, we identified policy management system as a core security
criterion. By taking a policy-oriented approach, we enabled the GORE infrastructure
to perform real-time service provisioning based on user requests. Following this iden-
tification, our second concept involved the proposal of a Policy Management module
that is placed within the GORE architecture, more specifically within the orches-
tration layer. We identified the different stakeholder or beneficiaries of the GORE
infrastructure, primarily the IoT users and application owners. Furthermore, we de-
veloped a mature policy structure for policy and rule specifications, thus designing a
relatively mature policy management framework for the GORE infrastructure.
Finally, we proved the effectiveness of our proposed GORE infrastructure and its
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supporting policy management module through the development of a test-bed. This
test-bed was developed utilizing Smart Transportation Systems as the base foundation
and displayed the effectiveness of our GORE infrastructure and its policy management
module in realizing a near real-time and low latency communication environment.
7.1 Contributions
The primary contributions of this work are: (i) creation of an edge-networking
based computational paradigm called GORE and (ii) the integration of a policy man-
agement module within the GORE architecture to validate, authenticate, and autho-
rize user requests for applications hosted with a single node in a GORE environment.
7.1.1 GORE Computing Contributions
Proposed as a potential solution to real-time, on-demand access to robust ser-
vices, the GORE infrastructure provides smart devices with the capability to request
and receive services in low-latency networks in a distributed environment. Utiliz-
ing the power of cloud computing coupled with GORE, interoperable communication
between distributed services and infrastructures can be established with minimal la-
tency and loss of data. The GORE environment consists of three layers. The primary
contribution of this work resides in the orchestration layer. The orchestration layer
is designed to function as the core component of the GORE architecture, ensuring
every request and communication received by a node in the GORE infrastructure is
validated, analyzed and aggregated to produce the most efficient and reliable result.
The uniqueness of the GORE infrastructure falls within this “Orchestration Layer”.
This layer provides core functionalities and maturity which otherwise is absent in
other similarly proposed edge-based computing models. The orchestration layer by
design, analyzes all incoming communication and collaboration requests with the as-
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Figure 7.1: GORE at the Edge Below the Cloud.
sistance of the policy management module which is our second contribution in this
work. Once a request is evaluated by the policy management module, and a decision
made, services are either provisioned to a user or denied. The provisioning of services
indicates that the Data Aggregation module will collect relevant data from the IoT
device, the centralized cloud data centers, and adjacent localized GNs, to provide the
end-user with accurate and updated information.
While the orchestration layer handles request, it is also designed to parse through
the communication protocols that IoTs are and will be designed to handle. This
provisioning takes place in the Data API and Distributed Messaging Service module.
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Currently, three primary IoT protocols are know, primarily the RPL, CoAP, and the
6LoWPAN protocols. However, the technology market has shown growing trends to-
wards IoT. Furthermore, the vast support toward the development of a uniform IoT
communication infrastructure by major companies such as Nvidia, Intel, and Mer-
cedes leads us to believe that newer, more robust, communication protocols are on the
horizon. This places the GORE infrastructure at a prime location for service provi-
sioning. As, not only does the proposed infrastructure have a uniform communication
capability, but it also accommodates for provisioning of resources such as network-
ing, computation, and short-term storage for geographically located IoT devices that
require real-time alerts about events in their surrounding. Fig 7.1 illustrates the ge-
ographically distributed nature envisioned for the GORE infrastructure. Although
this work related the GORE architecture to supporting Smart Transportation Sys-
tems, the flexibility of the architecture, allows a GORE infrastructure to function as
decentralized nodes intelligently communicating with centralized data centers only
utilizing resources as required. By placing GORE environments at the edge of the
network, development of Smart Cities, Grids, and Buildings, can be made a reality.
Finally, a prominent and unique contribution of the GORE infrastructure is in-
dependence. While the different layers of the infrastructure have multiple inter-
connected components, each component has been specifically designed to function
independently as a module. For example, if an owner of a GN would like to utilize
his own customized Data API, the company would utilize the Gateway-based APIs
in the Resource Interface Layer and create a custom API for data processing and
recognition. Another example could be a tenant who would like to utilize another
company’s Policy Management module. They would then replace the current policy
management framework module with their customized module. This flexibility allows
for other computing models such as Fog Computing and Edge Computing to be easily
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integrated into a large decentralized environment, thus making GORE a very elastic
infrastructure.
7.1.2 Policy Management Framework Contributions
In addition to the core functionalities of the orchestration layer in a GORE archi-
tecture, the integration of the policy management module is the second vital contri-
bution to this work. The policy management module is an independent component
designed to reside within the orchestration layer of the GORE architecture. This
module evaluates user requests against specified policies for an application and the
node hosting the application. This research designed a well-defined policy specifica-
tion with a definite rule schema that will allow for efficient rule and policy evaluation
by the policy decision engine. The goal of the policy management module is to deliver
services to users in real-time.
In addition to the rule and policy specifications, the policy management module
also consists of independent sub-modules for policy and rule analysis to determine
conflicts. These conflicts arise when multiple administrators for an application create
rules similar or redundant to each other for a single application. Therefore, this
research proposed two unique algorithms. The first algorithm utilized a segmentation-
based approach and set operations to analyze rules in a policy and segregate the
conflicting rules into segments for resolution. The second algorithm took the identified
segments and extracted the unique attributes to determine the underlying conflicting
conditions and then, based on the administrators resolution preference, and once again
utilizing set-operations, the conflicting rules were resolved to produce a conflict-free
policy. These policies could then be stored in the policy repository of the policy
management module for usage by the decision engine.
The addition of the policy management framework to the GORE infrastructure
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reduces the risk of conflicts occurring when a GN or GI is servicing a client’s request.
Additionally, the framework mitigates the risk of data integrity and accessibility being
violated by an unauthorized device. Finally, the framework prevents the occurrence
of redundant policies from being uploaded to the policy decision engine, thus ensuring
that IoT devices are met with minimal latency when requesting services.
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